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ARTICLES
CAN THE BLIND LEAD THE BLIND? RETHINKING EQUAL
PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE THROUGH AN EMPIRICAL
EXAMINATION OF BLIND PEOPLE’S UNDERSTANDING OF RACE
Osagie K. Obasogie∗

ABSTRACT
Lay understandings of race largely attribute its salience—why race is a noticeable, conspicuous,
and striking aspect of human relations—to its visual obviousness. To the extent that law often
reflects lay understandings of social phenomena, I show in this Article that equal protection
jurisprudence has similarly come to orient around the idea that the salience, coherence, and
perceptibility of race stems from visually obvious cues (skin color, facial features, etc.) that are selfevidently known and exist apart from any broader social or legal process. I call this equal
protection’s “race” ipsa loquitur trope; race is thought to speak for itself. For courts, the moral,
legal, and conceptual salience of race stems from a reductionist account that largely treats it as a
visually obvious attribute that is self-evidently known by simple observation.
“Race” ipsa loquitur has influenced the Court’s administration of equal protection in at least
three areas. First, the tiered system of scrutiny used to determine the appropriate level of review
(strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review) for laws burdening particular
groups’ privileges, in large part, racial minorities and groups with visible race-like traits while
affording lesser scrutiny to others. The presumably self-evident nature of race largely justifies the
Court’s heightened judicial solicitude for racial minorities. Second, the Court’s embracing of
colorblindness as a normative framework for understanding equal protection’s boundaries is
driven by a visual metaphor that frames race and discrimination as quintessentially visual
experiences. Since it is largely believed that blindness or not being able to see distinctions in color
diminishes a person’s ability to understand race, the Court’s colorblind approach attempts to
transcend racial antagonisms through a jurisprudence of racial non-recognition that, by being
“blind” to color, is thought to mimic blind people’s racially utopian experiences. Third, the postWashington v. Davis intent doctrine that has come to stand for the need to demonstrate
individual malice to sustain claims of discrimination similarly frames race as a self-evident trait
whose salience is thought to exist on its own terms (apart from social structure and racial

∗

Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law with a
joint appointment at University of California, San Francisco (“UCSF”) Department of
Social and Behavioral Sciences. B.A. Yale University; J.D. Columbia Law School; Ph.D.
University of California, Berkeley. I am extremely thankful for comments on previous
drafts by Kathryn Abrams, Ashutosh Bhagwat, Khiara Bridges, Devon Carbado, Benjamin
Depoorter, Lauren Edelman, Neil Fligstein, Laura Gomez, Cheryl Harris, Jerry Kang,
Sonia Katyal, Ethan Leib, Ian Haney López, Melissa Murray, Kimani Paul-Emile, Sarah
Song, and Joan Williams. Nancy Zhang and Katy Chase provided excellent research
assistance. Portions of this Article were first developed as part of my doctoral dissertation;
other portions expand upon material in Osagie K. Obasogie, Do Blind People See Race?
Social, Legal, and Theoretical Considerations, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 585 (2010).

705

706

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:3

hierarchy) to render a reductionist conception where race is simply visually obvious.
The centrality of “race” ipsa loquitur to equal protection jurisprudence raises a critical question
that has yet to be addressed by the literature: does the salience of race—the ability to see and
differentiate among human groups—turn on obvious visual cues? This Article presents an
alternative viewpoint that critiques equal protection’s emphasis on visibility by empirically
examining the experiences and understanding of race among people without vision, i.e. blind
people. The data collected from these respondents empirically isolates the significance of vision to
the salience of race as a sociological manner, which provides empirical data to critically assess this
theory of race in equal protection law. I find not only that blind people’s conception of race is as
robust as those with vision, but that they also understand race visually. Moreover, I also find that
institutional and interpersonal interactions produce blind people’s visual sensibility regarding
race. This evidence suggests that the visual salience of race is not merely an ocular phenomenon
but a social one, which belies the “race” ipsa loquitur understanding of race embedded in equal
protection doctrine and scholarship.
This research and its findings are important for equal protection in that they empirically
destabilize the “race” ipsa loquitur trope enmeshed in this jurisprudence. It also offers data
demonstrating how the embedded assumption throughout these three areas of equal protection fails
to appreciate the ways in which this salience is produced by constitutive social practices that make
human difference visible in particular ways. I argue, as a normative matter, that “race” ipsa
loquitur must be thoroughly eviscerated from equal protection; it is simply an inaccurate and
therefore inappropriate framework from which to understand race. The theory of race driving equal
protection must be reconstructed around the social practices shown by this Article to produce the
salience of race that has been mistakenly assumed to be self-evident for far too long. I conclude by
discussing why it is important for the Court to have an empirically accurate understanding of how
race becomes salient and how re-orienting equal protection’s theory of race around social practices
can re-introduce the important roles of social context and racial hierarchy in generating a just and
equitable jurisprudence.
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I. INTRODUCTION: LAW AND THE VISUAL SALIENCE OF RACE
Leonard Rhinelander was the socialite son of a wealthy New York family.
In the fall of 1921, he met Alice Jones through her sister Grace and the
couple quickly became quite fond of each other. On at least two occasions
during their first few months together, the couple—Alice was then twentytwo, four years Leonard’s senior—secluded themselves for days in New York
1
City hotels where they were intimate. Over the next few years, Leonard
took several extended trips at his father’s request that separated the couple,
but they remained in touch through frequent letters proclaiming their love
for one another. Leonard returned to New York in May of 1924, and the
couple secretly married that October, as Leonard’s family was not fond of
the former Ms. Jones. The couple lived in secret with Alice’s family for
about a month, until a story appeared in the Standard Star, a local paper in
New Rochelle, titled: “Rhinelanders’ Son Marries the Daughter of a Colored
2
Man.” Thus, a wealthy White man from 1920s New York high society was
exposed as having committed one of the biggest social faux pas one could
imagine at the time: marrying a Black woman.

1
2

Angela Onwuachi-Willig, A Beautiful Lie: Exploring Rhinelander v. Rhinelander as a
Formative Lesson on Race, Identity, Marriage, and Family, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2393, 2408 (2007).
Id. at 2409.
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3

Alice Jones with her mother and father.

Alice was the biracial daughter of an English mother and a father
described as “a bent, dark complexioned man who is bald, except for a
4
fringe of curly white hair.” A few days after the story broke, Leonard was
shown a copy of Alice’s birth certificate that documented her race as Black.
5
Two weeks later, Leonard filed suit for an annulment. The reason? Fraud:
Leonard alleged that Alice misrepresented that she was not colored to trick
him into marrying her. The stage was now set for what some might
characterize as, up until then, the race trial of the century: a legal
determination of whether Alice committed fraud by “passing” as White or if
Leonard knew Alice’s race before their marriage. Put differently, the
question became what did Leonard know and, more importantly, what
should he have known?
The strategy developed by Isaac Mills, Leonard’s attorney, portrayed him
as mentally challenged and Alice’s physical features as racially ambiguous.
The defense from Alice’s counsel, Lee Parsons Davis, was quite simple:

3
4
5

Alice Rhinelander with her Mother and Father, 1925 (© Bettmann/CORBIS).
EARL LEWIS & HEIDI ARDIZZONE, LOVE ON TRIAL: AN AMERICAN SCANDAL IN BLACK AND
WHITE 25 (2001).
Angela Onwuachi-Willig notes that:
An annulment, as opposed to a divorce, would sever ties completely between the
Rhinelanders and Joneses because it would place Leonard and Alice back into
their original positions as unmarried persons and, by law, would entirely erase
their marital union. Also, in many cases, an annulment importantly left the
fraudulent party with no claim to alimony or property and thereby was essential if
the Rhinelander family wanted Alice to have no, or at least very little, access to
Leonard’s or the family’s assets. Finally, an annulment was critical because finding
that Alice was a colored woman without obtaining an annulment would forever
mark Leonard as unmarriageable for a more “suitable” wife, meaning a white
woman of the same socioeconomic station and background, and also as unsuitable
for the Rhinelander family name.
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 1, at 2411.
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there was no fraud as Alice’s blackness was visually obvious. Davis mockingly
said to the jury:
I think the issue that Judge Mills should have presented to you was not
mental unsoundness but blindness. Blindness . . . [Y]ou are here to
determine whether Alice Rhinelander before her marriage told this man
Rhinelander that she was white and had no colored blood. You are here
to determine next whether or not that fooled him. Whether or not he
could not see with his own eyes that he was marrying into a colored
6
family.

After raising serious doubts about Leonard’s cognitive disability, much of
Davis’ defense rested on showing that Alice’s race could be known by simply
looking at her body. This became a central theme in Davis’ argument; he
repeatedly asked Alice and her sisters to stand up and show the jury their
hands and arms. But to hammer home this point, Davis wanted the jury to
see all of Alice’s body—not just hands and arms that might darken over time
with routine exposure to sunlight. Given the couple’s pre-marital relations,
Davis argued that Leonard had seen all of Alice before being married, and
that it was crucial for the jury to see the same intimate details of Alice’s body
that Leonard did before marrying her. Against objections from Leonard’s
attorneys, the judge allowed it. And what transpired was one of the biggest
race spectacles of the twentieth century. From the Court record:
The Court, Mr. Mills, Mr. Davis, Mr. Swinburne, the jury, the plaintiff,
the defendant, her mother, Mrs. George Jones, and the stenographer left
the courtroom and entered the jury room. The defendant and Mrs.
Jones then withdrew to the lavatory adjoining the jury room and, after a
short time, again entered the jury room. The defendant, who was
weeping, had on her underwear and a long coat. At Mr. Davis’ direction
she let down her coat, so that the upper portion of her body, as far down
as the breast, was exposed. She then, again at Mr.Davis’ direction,
covered the upper part of her body and showed to the jury her bare legs,
up as far as her knees. The Court, counsel, the jury and the plaintiff then
7
re-entered the court room.

This dramatic revealing of Alice’s body to the jury composed of all White
married men was stunning, especially for 1920s sensibilities. Once back in
the courtroom, Davis asked Leonard, “Your wife’s body is the same shade as
it was when you saw her in the Marie Antoinette [hotel] with all of her
clothing removed?” Leonard responded affirmatively, to which Davis said
8
“That is all.”
Shortly after this display of Alice’s body to the jury and Leonard’s
acknowledgement, the jury returned with a verdict in favor of Alice, finding
that there was no fraud. To put a finer point on this: an all White male jury
6
7
8

Id. at 2416 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 2429.
Id.
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in 1925 ruled against a wealthy White male socialite and in favor of a
working class Black woman because her race was found to be so visually
obvious that there could have been no deception. The jury found that
Alice’s body, and race in general, visually spoke for itself. Alice did not have
to take the stand at any point during the trial. Her body, and the jury’s
ability to observe it, was all of the evidence that was needed.

* * *
This Article argues that the idea that race visually speaks for itself—a
9
notion that I call “race” ipsa loquitur —is not something that is marginally
relevant to law, or an idea that occasionally arises in cases such as Rhinelander
v. Rhinelander. Rather, this notion that race is visually obvious and that its
salience—in terms of its conspicuousness and striking nature—stems from
self-evident visual distinctions fundamentally orients law’s most robust
mechanism for governing race and racial discrimination: equal protection.
This jurisprudence has come to embrace a “race” ipsa loquitur sensibility that
shapes the Court’s approach to race and discrimination in at least three
regards: (1) its scrutiny inquiry to determine the standard of review (strict
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis) to apply to certain groups’
claims of discrimination; (2) using colorblindness as a framework to
conceptualize equal protection’s normative boundaries; and (3) the intent
doctrine, which requires a demonstration of discriminatory purpose or
malice to sustain equal protection claims. In each instance, an implied
theory of race that is common among lay conceptualizations also orients the
Court’s approach: that the salience of race turns on and/or can be reduced
to its visual obviousness, and that this salience is self-evident in a manner
that is exogenous to any broader social or legal practice. It simply is, and is
known by merely looking. By framing the salience of race as an ocular
phenomenon and disaggregating it from any social context or structural
notion of racial hierarchy, modern equal protection jurisprudence has
produced a sociologically thin understanding of race that reduces it to a
series of discrete, visually obvious physical traits whose striking nature and
conspicuousness are thought to emanate from mere observation.

9

Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin term often used in tort law meaning “the thing speaks for itself.”
I use the term “race” ipsa loquitur to suggest that equal protection jurisprudence uses a
similar concept to understand race as a visually obvious trait that is salient outside of any
broader social or legal processes. Similarly, it simply “speaks for itself.” Others have used
this phrase in different contexts. See generally Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of
Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781
(1994); Stephen Wolf, Note, Race Ipsa: Vote Dilution, Racial Gerrymandering, and the
Presumption of Racial Discrimination, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 225 (1997).
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In this Article, I make a critical departure against the grain of this trend
within equal protection jurisprudence by arguing that this influential—
indeed, largely unquestioned—theory of race fundamentally misconstrues
how race becomes salient, which deeply warps important aspects of this
jurisprudence. I argue that the visual salience of race is not obvious or a selfevident observation that occurs anterior to any other social process. Rather,
I contend that the very ability to see race is a social phenomenon: social
practices produce the salience that allows us to discern racial differences in
particular ways. This is the constitutive theory of race identified by this
Article. The visual salience of race—why it is striking, how people are able
to apprehend group difference—has little to do with individuals’ visual
capacities or certain traits’ inherently striking nature. Rather, the salience
and ability to see these differences is produced by social interactions.
My approach is theoretically informed by art history literature that
examines how our visual experiences are not neutral engagements with the
10
world, but are rather produced by social relations and forces.
These
scholars argue that what we see, how we see, and the very ability to see
certain things—particularly race—are structured by social contexts that
shape the way we pay attention to some things and not others. Art historian
Martin Berger notes:
Despite the human propensity to privilege sight, and the long-standing
Western tendency to root racial designations in observable traits, images
do not persuade us to internalize racial values embedded within them, so
much as they confirm meanings for which the discourses and structures
of our society have predisposed us. Instead of selling us on racial systems
we do not already own, the visual field powerfully confirms previously
11
internalized beliefs.

I draw upon this literature to argue that the visual salience of race—why
it is noticeable, why it stands out—has little to do with individuals’ visual
capacities or certain traits’ inherently striking nature. Rather, this salience is
produced by social interactions. I empirically demonstrate the socially
productive rather than self-evident nature of this visual salience through an
innovative research question that asks: how do blind people understand
race?
It is largely assumed that individuals without vision have a diminished
understanding of race. This assumption is inextricably tied to the “race” ipsa
10

11

See, e.g., JONATHAN CRARY, SUSPENSIONS OF PERCEPTION: ATTENTION, SPECTACLE, AND
MODERN CULTURE (1999); JONATHAN CRARY, TECHNIQUES OF THE OBSERVER: ON VISION
AND MODERNITY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1992); RACE-ING ART HISTORY: CRITICAL
READINGS IN RACE AND ART HISTORY (Kymberly N. Pinder ed. 2002); SEEING HIGH & LOW:
REPRESENTING SOCIAL CONFLICT IN AMERICAN VISUAL CULTURE (Patricia Johnson ed.
2006).
MARTIN A. BERGER, SIGHT UNSEEN: WHITENESS AND AMERICAN VISUAL CULTURE 1 (2005).
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loquitur trope embedded in law and society; the inability to see the selfevident nature of race is thought to preclude any robust appreciation of its
salience. But as a way to critique the dominant assumptions about race and
vision in lay perspectives and doctrinal conversations, I engage in qualitative
research with blind respondents concerning their understanding of and
experiences with race. The findings from this research are both important
and counterintuitive: not only do blind people have an understanding of
race that is no less meaningful or substantive than sighted individuals’, but
they also understand it visually, i.e., in terms of facial features, skin
complexion, and other visual attributes typically associated with race.
The doctrinal implications of this research are significant. These
findings empirically destabilize the “race” ipsa loquitur theory of race at the
heart of equal protection jurisprudence, which provides intellectual and
doctrinal space to rethink the parameters of inclusion and exclusion for
higher forms of scrutiny, colorblindness as a normative framework for the
scope of equal protection, and modern fixations on intent as the touchstone
for demonstrating the discriminatory nature of facially neutral laws. It is
important to clearly articulate that the claim being made is not one of cause
and effect; I do not assert that the scrutiny inquiry, colorblindness, or the
intent requirement exist the way that they do primarily because of what I
have identified as “race” ipsa loquitur. Each of these jurisprudential
developments have a distinct genealogy better explained by various social,
legal, and historical developments. Rather, I identify a conceptual trend
within equal protection doctrine linked to lay understandings of race that
highlights a common emphasis on visibility across these three areas that may
warp important aspects of the jurisprudence. In each of these three realms,
the assumption that the social and interpersonal salience of race turns upon
self-evident visual differences is a central (yet at times hidden) organizing
principle that gives coherence to the jurisprudence, both in their individual
parts and as a whole. Therefore, the critical role of this Article’s empirical
contribution is that qualitative data on blind people’s visual understanding
of race disrupts this centrality of visibility, which may allow for a normative
reconceptualization of equal protection in a manner that takes seriously the
social practices that produce the salience of race to encourage a more
equitable and inclusive jurisprudence. Put differently, this may be one
instance where the blind can lead the blind; qualitative data on the life
experiences of those without the ability to see might give insight to a legal
system that privileges vision in a manner that blinds it to the social practices
that produce the visual salience of race.
It is also important to mark this Article’s conceptual boundaries. The
purpose here is not to revisit the idea that race has multiple influences such
as language, culture, and ancestry. Nor is its purpose to rearticulate the now
common claim that race is a social construction, or that the meanings that we
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attach to various human bodies do not stem from natural or inherent group
differences, but rather grow out of broader social and political dynamics.
Race scholarship in law, the social sciences, and the humanities have already
12
eloquently and persuasively made these points. Instead, this Article tries to
critique a core aspect of race ideology that transcends almost all race
scholarship and is embedded in equal protection jurisprudence: that
“seeing race”—related to, yet apart from, any social construction that
attaches meanings to bodies—is an unmediated visual experience whose
salience is simply self-evident on its own terms. This paves the way for a
constitutive understanding of race that, related to constructionist projects,
draws attention to how social practices produce our ability to see society in
particular ways. The qualitative portion of this Article provides empirical
evidence that gives life to this critique. Although the salience of race is experienced as something that is visually obvious within the sighted community, blind respondents’ experiences highlight the extent to which this salience is constituted by various social practices. As such, this Article
challenges the dominant lay and legal viewpoints that vision is a prerequisite
for having a complete understanding of race. These findings empirically
destabilize equal protection’s “race” ipsa loquitur trope and raise important
questions about its current role in the administration of this jurisprudence.
This Article is divided into five parts. Part II provides an overview of the
“race” ipsa loquitur trope in equal protection doctrine and scholarship, paying
particular attention to its manifestations in the scrutiny inquiry,
colorblindness, and the intent doctrine. Part III then describes the
methodology and findings from the qualitative data collected through over
100 interviews with blind individuals about their understandings of and
experiences with race. This Part provides robust qualitative data supporting
my key argument: that the “race” ipsa loquitur trope embedded in equal
protection law mischaracterizes the visual salience of race as an ocular rather
than social phenomenon. The visually striking nature of race is produced by
social practices rather than self-evidently observed. Part IV discusses these
empirical findings’ significance for three areas of equal protection
jurisprudence—the scrutiny inquiry, colorblindness, and the intent
doctrine—to offer preliminary thoughts on how equal protection might be
reimagined along lines that are sensitive to the socially productive rather
than self-evident conceptions of racial salience. I conclude in Part V with a
brief discussion of why it is important for equal protection jurisprudence to
work from theories of race that are empirically robust. I then suggest, as a
12

See, e.g., IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (10th ed.
2006); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S (2d ed. 1994); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993).
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normative matter, that equal protection rid itself of “race” ipsa loquitur and
re-orient its theory of race around the social practices giving rise to the
visibility of race. This can re-introduce the important roles of social context
and racial hierarchy in equal protection deliberations, which can lead to a
more equitable and just jurisprudence.

II. RACE IN EQUAL PROTECTION LAW AND SCHOLARSHIP
A. Context Giving Rise to Equal Protection’s “Race” Ipsa Loquitur Trope
Several areas of law have played a key role in defining race and shaping
13
14
race relations, such as slave law,
anti-miscegenation law,
and
15
naturalization law. Nevertheless, equal protection has played an important
part in governing race in the United States, and is worthy of special
attention in understanding how specific aspects of American jurisprudence
have been shaped by the presumption that the salience of race stems
primarily from self-evidently known visual cues.
Although the most significant shifts in equal protection law did not
occur until the 1950s, subtle changes in how law approached its duty to

13

14

15

Legal historian Lawrence Friedman notes in his classic work, A History of American Law,
that:
The most visible American pariah, before the Civil War, was the Negro slave. As
we have seen, an indigenous system of law grew up to govern the “peculiar
institution” of slavery. What was at first a law for the servant class developed
deeper and deeper overtones of color. The slave laws then became laws about the
fate of a race.
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 192 (1973). See also ROBERT M.
COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975); KENNETH M.
STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH (1956);
Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 221 (1999); Wilbert E. Moore, Slave Law and Social Structure, 26 J. NEGRO HIST. 171
(1941); Mark Tushnet, The American Law of Slavery, 1810–1860: A Study in the Persistence of
Legal Autonomy, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 119 (1975).
Rachel Moran notes “antimiscegenation laws have played an integral role in defining
racial identity and enforcing racial hierarchy. . . . For both blacks and Asians, segregation
in sex, marriage, and family was a hallmark of intense racialization and entrenched
inequality.” RACHEL MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE AND
ROMANCE 17–18 (2003). See also RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX,
MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION (2003); SEX, LOVE, RACE: CROSSING BOUNDARIES IN
NORTH AMERICAN HISTORY (Martha Hodes ed. 1999).
Ian Haney López draws a direct link between the United States’ racial make-up and its
naturalization laws: “The racial composition of the U.S. citizenry reflects in part the
accident of world migration patterns. More than this, however, it reflects the conscious
design of U.S. immigration and naturalization laws.” LÓPEZ, supra note 13, at 27. See also,
Mae M. Ngai, Legacies of Exclusion: Illegal Chinese Immigration during The Cold War Years, 18
J. AMERICAN ETHNIC HIST. 3 (1998); Mae M. Ngai, The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien:
Immigration Restriction and Deportation Policy in the United States, 1921–1965, 21 LAW & HIST.
REV. 69 (2003).
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minorities began in the late 1930s with United States v. Carolene Products. The
case is less significant for its holding (the Court upheld a federal statute
forbidding the shipment of filled milk in interstate commerce) than it is for
its fourth footnote. Justice Stone lays the foundation for modern equal
protection conversations by writing that there might be a stricter standard of
review for laws “directed at particular religious or national or racial
minorities . . . [since] prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
16
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.”
17
Called “the most celebrated footnote in constitutional law,” it has
spurred a lengthy and influential discussion within the legal academy.
However, Footnote Four brought focus to a new question that the Court did
not fully engage until almost twenty years later in Brown: how failed political
processes can disproportionately affect racial minorities due to irrational
18
prejudice that unconstitutionally bars them from majoritarian lawmaking.
This draws attention to the importance of defending liberties that are
essential to the proper functioning of a democratic political process, which
recognizes the procedural challenges to democratic self-governance.
Moreover, the Court’s role is not simply to give scrutiny to possible
restrictions on the political process in general, but specifically those
restrictions on the political process that hamper minorities’ ability to protect
their interests through this very process. This new form of scrutiny was not
to apply to any and all minorities; a key aspect of democratic self-governance
is that some minorities who fail to gain majoritarian popularity must
inevitably experience defeat. Rather, Footnote Four suggests special
solicitude for minorities that are discrete and insular.

16
17
18

United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (emphasis added).
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1087 (1982).
Footnote Four sets a new agenda to protect minorities who are unable to protect
themselves due to a failed political process. The footnote states, in full, that:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. It
is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of
legislation. . . . Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the
review of statutes directed at particular religious . . . or national . . . or racial
minorities . . . whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (internal citations omitted).
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But what does this mean? Louis Lusky, law clerk to Justice Stone at the
time Carolene Products was decided and largely credited as the author of
Footnote Four, has written:
As a matter of language, “discrete” means separate or distinct and
“insular” means isolated or detached. The words do not describe aliens
as such; many of them, who are anglophones, pass unnoticed, and many if
not most others fit into the social scene with little difficulty. . . . In my
opinion, the phrase “discrete and insular” applies to groups that are not
embraced within the bond of community kinship but are held at arm’s
length by the group or groups that possess dominant political and
19
economic power. . . . Justice Stone, I believe, would have agreed.

What stands out in this passage is Lusky’s common sense application of
the terms “discrete” and “insular.” To Lusky (and by inference Justice Stone
and the Carolene Court), “discrete” largely means those who cannot pass by
unnoticed, and “insular” means those who keep to themselves due to
political or economic marginalization. The grammatical structure of the
phrase—”discrete” as the primary descriptor further refined by “insular”
with the conjunction “and”—suggests, as does Lusky’s explanation, that the
Carolene Court was targeting those groups whose insularity stemmed from
their discreteness. This puts the inability to pass unnoticed—a nod towards
visibility—at the heart of the influential Footnote Four.

B. “Race” Ipsa Loquitur and Its Doctrinal Manifestations
Equal protection’s post-Carolene transition to having a heightened
concern for minority groups’ experiences has led the “race” ipsa loquitur
trope to, over time, become embedded in the resulting jurisprudence in at
least three different ways: (1) the doctrinal considerations for which groups
are eligible for higher forms of judicial scrutiny; (2) the Court’s normative
claims concerning colorblindness as a guidepost for reading and applying
the Equal Protection Clause; and (3) the requirement that discriminatory
intent—not merely disparate impact—must be demonstrated to sustain
claims that a facially neutral law or practice violates equal protection. This
section will consider each of these in turn.

1. Equal Protection’s Scrutiny Inquiry
Just prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education,
Footnote Four’s underlying sentiment—that stronger judicial oversight
should be provided for minority groups—made its first appearance in the
main body of a Supreme Court opinion in Korematsu v. United States, which
19

Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1093,
1105 n.72 (1982) (emphasis added).
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concerned the constitutionality of Japanese internment during World War
20
This first articulation of what has become known as strict scrutiny
II.
nonetheless led the Court to uphold the executive order leading to the
21
internment of Japanese Americans. Korematsu established the now familiar
constitutional architecture where courts deploy strict scrutiny—where a law
must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest—to
laws implicating race, national origin, and alienage, while most other equal
protection challenges (except those implicating sex, gender, or children
born to parents that are not married, which receive intermediate scrutiny)
are merely afforded rational basis review: courts will uphold their
constitutionality as long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate
purpose.
While equal protection’s doctrinal development has been robust since
Korematsu and Brown, not enough thought has been given to understanding
precisely how courts understand race in fulfilling their constitutional duty to
use judicial review to protect the rights of these groups. Moreover, there is
even less coherency in the Court’s jurisprudence on the principles that
justify treating racial discrimination differently from other forms of groupbased subordination.
This is important since equal protection
jurisprudence dictates that a plaintiff’s group membership shapes the level
of review used to determine whether the state’s categorization is permissible.
The Court has extended stricter forms of scrutiny beyond mere rational
20

21

The Korematsu Court wrote “all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect. . . . [C]ourts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny.” Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
Justice Black concludes the majority opinion upholding Japanese internment by stating:
It is said that we are dealing here with the case of imprisonment of a citizen in a
concentration camp solely because of his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry
concerning his loyalty and good disposition towards the United States. Our task
would be simple, our duty clear, were this a case involving the imprisonment of a
loyal citizen in a concentration camp because of racial prejudice. Regardless of
the true nature of the assembly and relocation centers—and we deem it
unjustifiable to call them concentration camps with all the ugly connotations that
term implies—we are dealing specifically with nothing but an exclusion order. To
cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real
military dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue. Korematsu was
not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He
was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the
properly constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and
felt constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided that the
military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be
segregated from the West Coast temporarily, and finally, because Congress,
reposing its confidence in this time of war in our military leaders—as inevitably it
must—determined that they should have the power to do just this. There was
evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities considered that
the need for action was great, and time was short. We cannot—by availing
ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight—now say that at that time these
actions were unjustified.
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223–24 (emphasis omitted).
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basis review to classifications “based on race, sex, national origin, alienage,
and illegitimacy . . . [without] provid[ing] a clear overarching rationale for
why these five classifications, and not others, are particularly deserving of
22
Rather, the Court takes three factors (not
judicial solicitude.”
requirements) into consideration: whether the person bringing a claim is
part of a group that (1) has historically been subjected to discrimination; (2)
is a politically powerless minority; and (3) “exhibit[s] obvious, immutable, or
23
distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group.”
What appears first as a rather parsimonious three-prong test is actually
the product of several divergent jurisprudential threads coalescing around
modern equal protection commitments. The first prong’s concern with a
group’s history of discrimination stems from the Court’s post-Brown
commitments to affirmatively use judicial review to go beyond Plessy’s formal
equality to engage in a more pragmatic understanding of how the social
histories intertwined with legally-enforced discriminations can lead to
apartheid. The second prong’s concern for protecting politically powerless
groups is an offshoot of the second paragraph in Footnote Four. The Court
discusses the relevance of these first two prongs in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, which concerns the constitutionality of funding
24
schools through tax bases that systemically favored the wealthy. The Court
held that the appellees residing in underfunded areas did not constitute a
suspect class that could elicit a strict scrutiny analysis since they constituted
“a large, diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of
residence in districts that happen to have less taxable wealth than other
25
districts.” As such, the Court declined to exert its highest form of review
typically reserved for claims of racial discrimination since:
The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none of
the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such
disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
26
process.

22

23
24
25
26

Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case
of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 489 (1998) (citing Cass R. Sunstein, The
Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2441 (1994)) [hereinafter Yoshino,
Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection].
Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (citing Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638
(1986)).
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Id. at 28.
Id.
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The third prong’s emphasis on obvious, immutable, or distinguishing
characteristics provides the most direct articulation of how groups deemed
visually distinct are granted the highest form of protection. Yet there is
doctrinal evidence that this prong’s emphasis on granting groups with
visually distinguishable markers higher protections orients how the Court
thinks about the other two prongs. For example, in Mathews v. Lucas, the
Court said that while law often treats children born to parents that are not
married differently than those born in traditional families, “this
discrimination against illegitimates has never approached the severity or
pervasiveness of the historic legal and political discrimination against
women and Negroes . . . perhaps in part because illegitimacy does not carry
28
an obvious badge, as race or sex do.” Moreover, in Frontiero v. Richardson,
the plurality extended strict scrutiny (later revised to intermediate scrutiny
in Craig v. Boren) to sex-based discrimination based, in part, on a theory of
political powerlessness linked to the visibility of women’s sex difference: “it
can hardly be doubted that, in part because of the high visibility of the sex
characteristic, women still face pervasive, although at times more subtle,
discrimination in our educational institutions, in the job market and,
29
perhaps most conspicuously, in the political arena.” Therefore, the third
prong’s bluntness can be largely seen as a constitutive element of the other
two prongs in terms of how visibility orients the way the Court understands
the severity of groups’ political powerlessness and history of discrimination.
It can be argued that the visibility component was always already a
prerequisite for higher judicial scrutiny, but only became articulated as a
“prong” as a way to justify extending heightened scrutiny to sex-based
classifications. That is, the doctrinal justification for treating sex-based
classifications more like race classifications in Frontiero is that sex
discrimination, like race discrimination, orients around visible physical
differences that trigger prejudices that require stronger constitutional
protections to mitigate. Thus, the explicit articulation of a visibility prong
post-Frontiero without any deeper theoretical or structural consideration of
what race is and how it becomes salient can be reasonably seen as restating
what was up to then part of the obvious in equal protection: that the theory
27

28
29

I emphasize the importance of visibility over immutability since critiques of the latter
have been exhaustive and the Court has effectively subsumed immutability under
visibility. As such, immutability will only be discussed to the extent that it is an implicit
part of the visibility prong. See generally Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46
UCLA L. REV. 1375 (1999). See also Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection, supra
note 23, at 498–99.
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976). See also Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal
Protection, supra note 23, at 496–98.
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). See also Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in
Equal Protection, supra note 23, at 496–98.
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of race embedded in this jurisprudence is one that treats phenotype and
other human markers as visually obvious and self-evident triggers of
30
The implication is that these markers’
antagonistic social relations.
visibility and salience exist anterior to law and society rather than produced by
social and legal relations. That is, “race” ipsa loquitur: race, and its salience,
simply speak for themselves.

2. The Coherence of Colorblindness
“Race” ipsa loquitur is a significant part of equal protection jurisprudence
beyond serving as a gateway concept that arbitrates the level of scrutiny
afforded to various groups’ claims of discrimination. It also shapes the
Court’s normative vision for the appropriate role of government in using
racial categories.
This increasingly dominant perspective, known as
colorblindness, reflects a legal ideology of racial non-recognition; equal
protection is conceived as substantially limiting the State’s ability to take race
into consideration when allocating resources or benefits, even when done to
31
remedy ongoing disadvantages linked to past harms. To put a finer point
on it, colorblindness yields “an anticlassification understanding of the Equal
Protection Clause that accords race-conscious remedies and racial
32
subjugation the same level of constitutional hostility.”
While some have argued that contemporary colorblindness reflects a
33
good faith application of its intellectual antecedents, scholars have

30

31

32
33

Yoshino attributes the birth of the visibility and immutability factors to:
[A]n attempt to isolate the commonalities between the paradigm groups of race
and sex in the early 1970s. . . . Rather than operating from a priori principles, the
equal protection jurisprudence has been driven by the groups asking for
protection. Generally, the inquiry has not been, “What principles define groups
that are worthy of judicial protection?” but rather, “Is group X in or
out?” . . . Under this group-driven analysis, new groups are admitted by showing
that they are like groups that have already established their claim to protection.
Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection, supra note 23, at 559.
See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 16
(1991) (“Advocates of the color-blind model argue that nonrecognition by government is
a decision-making technique that is clearly superior to any race-conscious process.
Indeed, nonrecognition advocates apparently find the political and moral superiority of
this technique so self-evident that they think little or no justification is necessary.”).
Ian F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness,
59 STAN L. REV. 985, 988 (2007) [hereinafter López, “A Nation of Minorities”].
See generally ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992). Contemporary
articulations of colorblindness have at least two intellectual origins. John Marshall
Harlan gave the idea its first public articulation in his dissenting opinion in Plessy v.
Ferguson. In Plessy, Harlan famously broke from the majority, declaring, “[o]ur
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896). As a second intellectual influence,
advocates of colorblindness often point to Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “March on
Washington Address” in 1963, where he famously remarked “I have a dream that my four
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persuasively traced the birth of modern colorblindness to the unique racial
politics of the post-Civil Rights Era that generated a backlash against efforts
to use law and public policy to atone for the racial apartheid stemming from
34
centuries of racial subordination. This reaction has given rise to what Lani
Guinier and Gerald Torres call the “colorblind universe”—a general theory
of race and discrimination that has informed the Court’s understanding of
its commitment to racial equality in general and, more specifically, the
normative boundaries of equal protection remedies. Guinier and Torres
argue that this ideology is governed by three different claims about race.
First, rather than being a complex matrix of power relations, social status,
and historical relationships, “race is all about skin color . . . [or] a false
construction of phenotype that relies improperly on ascriptive physical
35
identifiers of ‘blood’ or ancestry.” That is, colorblindness frames race as a
series of superficial visual cues that mark human difference—skin color,
facial features, etc.—without attributing any inherent meaning to them.
This gives race and discrimination a theoretical symmetry that belies any
36
sensitivity to the existence of racial hierarchy.
Second, colorblindness
frames race consciousness as the equivalent of being racist. This is an odd
twist on the social constructionist perspective on race. While social
constructionism and colorblindness share a perspective that race does not
reflect inherent meanings, colorblindness advocates racial equality by
encouraging the state to abandon such categories while social
constructionists typically encourage race consciousness in order to
ameliorate the social conditions that perpetuate inequality. From the
colorblind perspective, “when one notices race, one is implicitly manifesting

34

35
36

little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of
their skin but by the content of their character.” Martin Luther King, Jr., The March on
Washington Address (Aug. 28, 1963), in GREAT AMERICAN SPEECHES 239, 242 (Gregory R.
Suriano ed., 1993).
The writings of Nathan Glazer and Patrick Moynihan, along with scholarship from the
legal academy, challenged the wisdom of affirmative action as public policy during this
period while also reconceptualizing the sociology of racial inequality as a phenomenon
linked to personal or group failures rather than racial hierarchy. See generally López, “A
Nation of Minorities,” supra note 33. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva similarly argues that
colorblindness “became the dominant racial ideology as the mechanisms and practices
for keeping blacks and other racial minorities ‘at the bottom of the well’
changed . . . [wheareas] contemporary racial inequality is reproduced though ‘new
racism’ practices that are subtle, institutional, and apparently nonracial.” EDUARDO
BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF
RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 2–3 (2006).
LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING
POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 38 (2002).
Id. (“When race is only pigmentation, all racial classifications are equally bad, despite
hierarchies of privilege or disadvantage that accompany the racial assignation.”).
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racial enmity or racial preference,” which poses “blindness” to race or nonrecognition as the only appropriate role for government.
Lastly,
colorblindness frames racism as a problem that bad individuals have rather
than a system of hierarchy that all individuals participate in. Guinier and
Torres note that from this perspective, “racism lacks any necessary nexus to
power or privilege, and any observed connection is incidental, merely a
38
result of the actions of people with a bad heart.”
Colorblindness has been an influential aspect of modern equal
protection jurisprudence since Regents of University of California v. Bakke,
where an unsuccessful White applicant to the University of California, Davis
School of Medicine (“UC Davis”) sued the University for excluding him
from consideration for one of the sixteen seats reserved for minority
applicants. In Bakke, two sets of four Justices each argued for and against an
anti-classification approach to the government’s use of race. This judicial
fragmentation led to the rather narrow holding that UC Davis’s admissions
program was unlawful but that race may continue to be a consideration.
One of the most significant parts of this case was Justice Powell’s opinion,
which sowed the seeds for constitutional colorblindness by concluding that
strict scrutiny applied to all racial categorizations, regardless of whether the
person is a member of a “discrete and insular minority.” Powell’s
declaration that “[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently
39
suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination” stripped
the affirmative action debate of the very context that gives legitimacy to such
programs. Therefore, “[i]n advocating the same standard in all cases,
Powell effectively argued that for constitutional purposes, preferential
treatment and Jim Crow laws amounted to the same thing—the central
40
claim of reactionary colorblindness.” This central claim is premised upon
a particular understanding of race: that it is a superficial, “skin deep,” and
merely descriptive characteristic that is inherently dubious for government
consideration—regardless of whether such consideration is done to
entrench existing racial privilege or remedy past subordination. Race is
sociologically and theoretically flat; it is thought to only describe an
individual’s physical traits or group membership rather than confer any
benefits or burdens.
The lack of conceptual depth accorded to
understanding precisely what race is and how it impacts individuals’ lives
leads to a reductionist understanding that draws heavily upon common
sense perspectives that (1) as a mere descriptive category, the salience of
race stems from its visually obvious character and that (2) blindness or non37
38
39
40

Id.
Id. at 39.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978).
López, “A Nation of Minorities,” supra note 33, at 1034.
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recognition, in terms of an inability or unwillingness to see race, necessarily
41
leads to racial equality.
Powell’s language has had a resounding effect on equal protection
jurisprudence beyond Bakke’s holding that race can continue to have limited
consideration in university admissions. Powell did not side with the Justices
in Bakke that explicitly advocated colorblindness through forgoing
constitutional deliberations and instead argued that Title VI prevented such
race-conscious university admissions. But Powell’s opinion greased the
wheels for subsequent successful claims of constitutional colorblindness, where
the Fourteenth Amendment itself was read to bar race-conscious decision
making. This was first fully developed in Richmond v. Croson, which entailed
a program that gave preferences for municipal contracts to minority-owned
businesses in Richmond, Virginia. Drawing upon many of the same
sentiments articulated by Justice Powell in Bakke, the Court held this scheme
to violate the Equal Protection Clause—but through using a jurisprudential
lens of colorblindness. There is an important link between Powell’s dicta in
Bakke and O’Connor’s reasoning in Croson:
Like Powell, O’Connor used the version of ethnicity picturing whites as
black to mandate strict scrutiny. Then, just as Powell did, in considering
whether structural disadvantage justified affirmative action, O’Connor
reverted to the version of ethnicity depicting all groups as the masters of
their own destiny, none suffering particular disadvantage. . . . Croson
posited a veritable tug of war between various identically situated ethnic
groups competing for the spoils of government largess. O’Connor

41

Powell argues:
Petitioner urges us to adopt for the first time a more restrictive view of the Equal
Protection Clause and hold that discrimination against members of the white
“majority” cannot be suspect if its purpose can be characterized as “benign.” The
clock of our liberties, however, cannot be turned back to 1868. It is far too late to
argue that the guarantee of equal protection to all persons permits the
recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than that
accorded others. The Fourteenth Amendment is not directed solely against
discrimination due to a “two-class theory”—that is, based upon differences
between “white” and Negro.
Once the artificial line of a “two-class theory” of the Fourteenth Amendment is put
aside, the difficulties entailed in varying the level of judicial review according to a
perceived “preferred” status of a particular racial or ethnic minority are
intractable. The concepts of “majority” and “minority” necessarily reflect
temporary arrangements and political judgments. . . . [T]he white “majority” itself
is composed of various minority groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of
prior discrimination at the hands of the State and private individuals. Not all of
these groups can receive preferential treatment and corresponding judicial
tolerance of distinctions drawn in terms of race and nationality, for then the only
“majority” left would be a new minority of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants. There is
no principled basis for deciding which groups would merit “heightened judicial
solicitude” and which would not. . . . The kind of variable sociological and political
analysis necessary to produce such rankings simply does not lie within the judicial
competence—even if they otherwise were politically feasible and socially desirable.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294–97.
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wrapped her opinion in the moral legitimacy afforded by the “dream of a
Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant.” But by
drawing blacks as white, she in effect reasoned as if this end state even
now existed: race was ostensibly already irrelevant to the life chances of
minorities in America. In this context, not only was affirmative action
unnecessary, but it threatened the American racial paradise by
victimizing whites, making them the new minority.
In its first
instantiation as Equal Protection law, colorblindness drew heavily on the
redescription of race constitutionally pioneered by Powell in Bakke,
positing whites as black to justify heightened review, but blacks as white
to deny the persistence of racial hierarchy and the necessity of racial
42
reconstruction.

Conceptualizing Blacks and Whites as equally advantaged and
disadvantaged groups is key to legitimizing colorblindness and its
jurisprudence of non-recognition as an appropriate norm for applying equal
protection principles. Moreover, it draws attention to the “race” ipsa loquitur
sensibility bubbling underneath colorblindness. Depicting race as a series of
conflicting ethnic groups elides the existence of racial hierarchy and makes
racial conflict appear episodic rather then entrenched. But the superficial
rendering of race that this vision of equal protection is based upon is one
that is thoroughly imbued by the lay presumption that race is a visually
obvious and trivial characteristic that only “marks” group membership and
cannot—indeed, should not—be used to acknowledge and resolve
inequality linked to persistent forms of racial subordination. We see this
clearly in a recent episode of constitutional colorblindness in Parents Involved
in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1. There, the Court struck
down two different public school district schemes that used race as a factor
43
to assign students to particular schools to diversify learning environments.
44
The Court was critical of the notion of diversity pursued by each district,
42
43

44

López, “A Nation of Minorities,” supra note 33, at 1050–51.
The Court noted that:
The school districts in these cases voluntarily adopted student assignment plans
that rely upon race to determine which public schools certain children may
attend. The Seattle school district classifies children as white or nonwhite; the
Jefferson County school district as black or “other.” In Seattle, this racial
classification is used to allocate slots in oversubscribed high schools. In Jefferson
County, it is used to make certain elementary school assignments and to rule on
transfer requests. In each case, the school district relies upon an individual
student’s race in assigning that student to a particular school, so that the racial
balance at the school falls within a predetermined range based on the racial
composition of the school district as a whole.
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 709–10 (2007).
The Court’s equal protection jurisprudence acknowledges diversity as a compelling
government interest that permits the usage of racial categories. However, the Court
notes in Parents Involved that:
The plans here are not tailored to acheiving a degree of diversity necessary to
realize the asserted educational benefits; instead the plans are tailored . . . to “the
goal established by the school board of attaining a level of diversity within the
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holding that the plans violated equal protection. In closing his majority
opinion, Chief Justice Roberts endorses colorblindness with remarkable
flair: “Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and could
not go to school based on the color of their skin. . . . The way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of
45
race.” Government efforts to use race-as-color as a mechanism to entrench
Jim Crow segregation is morally and constitutionally equated with
government efforts to diversify racially homogenous school districts, where
blindness—rearticulated by Justice Roberts as “stop discriminating on the
basis of race”—is the primary means through which the racial utopia of
“stop[ped] discrimination” is thought to be achieved.
But what makes this colorblind worldview—in particular, a colorblind
understanding of equal protection’s normative boundaries—seem so selfevidently coherent that Brown and Parents Involved can be read as companion
cases separated by a mere five decades when they actually address
fundamentally different questions of state-enforced racial subordination and
government use of race for remedial purposes? While the post-Civil Rights
social and political contexts are absolutely essential to understanding the
46
rise of colorblindness, existing scholarship has largely ignored the
cognitive influence of colorblindness as a metaphor in shaping the social,
legal, and political coherence of this approach. Equal protection scholars
have mostly limited the metaphorical significance of colorblindness to mere
rhetorical flourish; colorful language that cleverly characterizes a particular
ideology. For example, Reva Siegel writes that “[t]he rhetoric of colorblind
constitutionalism is but another mode of talking about race, invoking the
social fact of racial stratification in the course of denying its normative
47
significance.” From this perspective, Siegel limits the colorblind metaphor
to doing specific linguistic work in smoothing over otherwise inconsistent

45
46

47

schools that approximates the district’s overall demographics.” The districts offer
no evidence that the level of racal diversity necessary to achieve the asserted
educational benefits happens to coincide with the racial demographics of the
respective school districts—or rather the white/nonwhite or black/“other”
balance of the districts, since that is the only diversity addressed by the plans.
Indeed, in its brief Seattle simply assumes that the educational benefits track the
racial breakdown of the district. . . .
This working backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance, rather than
working forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides
the purported benefits, is a fatal flaw under our existing precedent.
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 727, 729.
Id. at 747–48.
See generally López, “A Nation of Minorities,” supra note 33 (reviewing historical evolution of
the demand of colorblindness); Julie Novkov, Toward a Legal Genealogy of Color Blindness,
MIDWEST POL. SCI. ASS’N, 2007, available at http://works.bepress.com/julie_novkov/3.
Reva B. Siegel, The Racial Rhetorics of Colorblind Constitutionalism: The Case of Hopwood v.
Texas, in RACE AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 29, 30 (Robert Post & Michael
Rogin eds., 1998) [hereinafter Siegel, The Racial Rhetorics of Colorblind Constitutionalism].
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48

understandings of race. Thus, in explaining the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Hopwood v. Texas, holding that the University of Texas cannot use race in law
school admissions, Siegel largely frames the metaphorical significance of
colorblindness as a function of its rhetorical ability to allow conflicting ideas
of race to rest comfortably together in a manner that maintains racial
49
subordination under seemingly neutral terms. In another article, Siegel
notes that “colorblindness discourse functions as a semantic code
[that] . . . can be used to characterize practices in ways that may either
disrupt or rationalize social stratification [in a manner that] . . . may offer
symbolic or expressive testimony of this society’s desire to achieve neutrality in
50
matter of race relations.”
But this understanding of metaphors—where its significance is seen
primarily as rhetorical—is inconsistent with contemporary research on
metaphors’ cognitive impacts. Metaphors are traditionally conceived as
being matters of figurative language, where a figure of speech is used to
convey an idea rather than expressing it literally. From this perspective,
metaphors as literary devices allow individuals to understand abstract,
intangible things or experiences in terms of concrete and known entities.
For example, the phrase “time is money” allows us to understand time, as an

48

49

50

Siegel notes:
[S]ince Reconstruction, white Americans have frequently coupled talk of
colorblindness with racial privacy rhetoric that seeks to protect relations of racial
status from government interference. As this historical analysis reveals, current
affirmative action law does not rest solely on values of colorblindness or racial
“nonrecognition”; it also draws on a normative discourse about the racial private
sphere, a domain of racial differences that the state may not disturb. If we read
the contradictory racial rhetorics structuring affirmative action jurisprudence in
light of this historical tradition, it is easier to understand their underlying
preoccupations and considerable persuasive power.
Id. at 31.
For example, Siegel argues that:
[T]he diversity and remedial holdings of the Hopwood opinion are premised on
two conflicting and irreconcilable conceptions of race, and so expose
contradictions in the larger body of equal protection jurisprudence on which the
case draws. Quoting liberally from the Supreme Court’s recent opinions, the Fifth
Circuit invokes both “thin” and “thick” conceptions of race. Sometimes the
Hopwood opinion insists that race is but a morphological accident, a matter of skin
color, no more. At other times, Hopwood discusses race as a substantive social
phenomenon, marking off real cultural differences amongst groups. These
conceptual inconsistencies are not incidental to the opinion, but instead arise out
of the conflicting justifications the Supreme Court has offered for imposing
constitutional restrictions on race-conscious regulation.
Invoking these
contradictory conceptions of race, Hopwood construes the Constitution to restrict
government from regulating on the basis of race and construes the Constitution to
protect the existing racial order.
Id. at 30–31.
Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts
and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 77, 78 (2000) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law].
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intangible and amorphous entity, in terms of the rather tangible value
51
This traditional understanding is
society places on monetary currency.
consistent with how legal scholars have framed the metaphorical significance
of colorblindness. Yet, limiting the significance of metaphor to mere
rhetoric is becoming increasingly disfavored; research is beginning to show
how metaphors have a much deeper impact on cognition in filtering how
individuals understand and interpret the social and political world around
them. Cognitive scientists are now arguing that “the locus of metaphor is
thought, not language[;] metaphor is a major and indispensible part of our
ordinary conventional way of conceptualizing the world, and that our
52
everyday behavior reflects our metaphorical understanding of experience.” To the
extent that “[t]he essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing
53
one kind of thing in terms of another,” metaphors are central to human
cognition rather than periphery speech acts. Metaphors’ commonsensical
salience—such as an old joke or a stable economy—come from their ability
to leverage fundamental aspects of human cognition that enable us to
experience intangible concepts through tangible ones, giving abstract
concepts materiality. This transfer of materiality then comes to orient much
of how we understand and experience intangibilities in the social world,
from boiling anger to sunny happiness.
Thus, metaphors shape human perception of social reality at a deeply
cognitive rather than merely textual level. They filter how information is
processed and understood, and thus how reality subjectively appears.
Metaphors play upon the underlying architecture of our cognitive systems to
give cohesive force to individuals’ ability to experience abstract concepts in
terms of known tangible entities in a manner that organizes entire thought
54
patterns.
Thus, metaphors allow us to seamlessly project one area of
experiential knowledge that is directly perceptible to other areas that are
55
merely conceptual or theoretical so as to give them substance. In short,
51
52
53
54

55

GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 7–9 (1980).
GEORGE LAKOFF, THE CONTEMPORARY THEORY OF METAPHOR, METAPHOR AND THOUGHT
(Andrew Ortony ed., 2d ed 1992) (emphasis added).
LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 52, at 5 (emphasis omitted).
See generally, Diana Ponterotto, The cohesive role of cognitive metaphor in discourse and
Ccnversation, in METAPHOR AND METONYMY AT THE CROSSROADS:
A COGNITIVE
PERSPECTIVE (Antonio Barcelona ed., 2000) (summarizing a shift in focus of research
studies on metaphors from strictly linguistic to cognitive).
As David Allbritton notes:
Metaphor has been shown to serve a number of important cognitive functions,
including that of making new conceptual domains accessible through
metaphorical “scaffolds” imported from better known domains, such as in the case
of metaphors in science, and providing a coherent framework or schema for
understanding such everyday topics as time, arguments, and emotions. In
addition, schemas derived from conceptual metaphors are capable of forming
connections between elements within a text representation, suggesting that
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metaphors allow certain ideas about the world to become thinkable. Neuroscientific
56
studies are beginning to show how certain aspects of our brains’ structure
and cognitive functioning allow metaphors to shape the way we think about
57
the world to make certain concepts thinkable in a much more constitutive
fashion than what is represented in legal scholarship. For example, Lera
Boroditsky and her colleagues have examined how different metaphorical
systems regarding crime can lead people to have fundamentally different
58
ways of thinking about solving social issues. Their experiment involved
exposing participants to descriptions of otherwise neutral crime reports that
were embedded with language either describing crime as a predator
(stalking victims, hiding in shadows) or as a virus (an infection that spreads,
59
risk factors that lead to disease, a containable problem). They found that

56

57
58

59

metaphor may play an important role in text comprehension. The most
interesting things that we learn about metaphor may turn out to be not the
mechanisms through which metaphors are understood but, rather, the things that
metaphor allows us to do.
David W. Allbritton, When Metaphors Function As Schemas: Some Cognitive Effects of Conceptual
Metaphors, 10 METAPHOR & SYMBOLIC ACTIVITY 33, 43 (1995).
See generally Lera Boroditsky et al., Sex, Syntax, and Semantics, in LANGUAGE IN MIND:
ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE & THOUGHT 61 (Dedre Gentner & Susan GoldinMeadow eds., 2003) (noting the way thought may be shaped by language); Ponterotto,
supra note 55, (noting the central role of metaphor in discourse); Gwenda L. Schmidt et
al., Beyond Laterality: A Critical Assessment of Research on the Neural Basis of Metaphor, 16 J.
INT’L NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL SOC’Y 1 (2010) (noting the pervasive and unique use of
metaphors in human communication); Catherine Mackenzie et al., The communication
effects of right brain damage on the very old and the not so old, 12 J. NEUROLINGUISTICS 79
(1999) (noting the inabilities to comprehend metaphor in research into brain damage);
Hiram H. Brownell et al., Appreciation of Metaphoric Alternative Word Meanings By Left and
Right Brain-Damaged Patients, 28 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 375 (1990) (same); Heath A.
Demaree et al., Brain Lateralization of Emotional Processing: Historical Roots and a Future of
Incorporating “Dominance”, 4 BEHAV. & COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE REVIEWS 3 (2005)
(reviewing research on the interrelation between brain damage and lexical emotion).
Allbritton, supra note 56.
See, e.g., Paul H. Thibodeau & Lera Boroditsky, Metaphors We Think With: The Role of
Metaphor in Reasoning, 6 PLOS ONE, Feb. 2011, at 1 (investigating the role metaphor plays
in social reasoning); Paul Thibodeau et al., When a bad metaphor may not be a victimless
crime: The role of metaphor in social policy, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FIRST ANNUAL
CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY 809 (Niels Taatgen & Hedderik van Rijn
eds., 2009) (same).
The researchers noted that:
The experiment was designed to explore whether simply embedding a common
metaphor in an otherwise neutral report about crime can systematically influence
people’s approach to solving the crime problem. In the task, participants read a
report about crime in a fictional city and then answered questions about the city.
The report contained mostly crime-relevant statistics, and also two brief instances
of either the crime as predator metaphor or the crime as virus metaphor. After
reading the report, participants answered questions relating to crime in the city.
Critically, in one of these questions, participants were asked to propose a solution
to the crime problem. If metaphors in fact have psychological weight, then being
exposed to different metaphors for crime may lead people to propose different
solutions to the city’s crime problem. For example, people exposed to the crime

Jan. 2013]

CAN THE BLIND LEAD THE BLIND?

729

“[w]hen crime was compared to a virus, participants were more likely to
suggest reforming the social environment of the infected community. When
crime was compared to a predator, participants were more likely to suggest
attacking the problem head on—hiring more police officers and building
60
jails.” The authors also note that these experimental results:
[S]uggest that metaphors can influence how people conceptualize and in
turn hope to solve important social issues. It appears that even casually
encountering one metaphor or another in discourse about crime can
lead people to unwittingly propose different types of solutions for the
crime problem. Importantly, it appears that the metaphors had a
subconscious effect on people’s reasoning. Very few of our participants
thought that the metaphors influenced their crime-reducing
61
suggestion.

This is rather remarkable experimental evidence of how metaphors
matter in shaping policy preferences and notions of justice rather than
merely reflecting otherwise established preferences through a coat of
superficial rhetoric.
In short, metaphors orient and organize the very ways in which we
perceive and think about the world. The significance of metaphors is not
simply about rhetorical flourish, but rather making certain abstract ideas
about the world thinkable by experiencing them through more tangible
concepts.
Therefore, to limit the metaphorical significance of
colorblindness to being rhetorical polish or to see its role as simply
obscuring the inconsistencies between various perspectives on race is to not
fully appreciate the constitutive role metaphors play in orienting normative
conceptions pertaining to the social and legal world. For example, Siegel
argues that “one needs a concept of social stratification—of status inequality
among groups arising out of the interaction of social structure and social
meaning—in order to make sense of the blindness trope at the heart of
62
antidiscrimination law.”
This is undoubtedly true. Yet, the converse is
equally important: we need to think seriously about how colorblindness
operates as a metaphor to make sense of how it becomes a coherent
perspective from which to understand social structure. The colorblind
metaphor facilitates a much deeper cognitive ordering beyond mere

60
61
62

as a predator metaphor might propose toughening law enforcement, while people
exposed to the crime as disease metaphor might think about dealing with
problems in the community and improving the social environment to prevent
future crime. Of course, it is also possible that such metaphors are simply
ornamental flourishes of language, and do not influence how people conceive of
important social issues like crime.
Thibodeau et al., supra note 59, at 810.
Id. at 814.
Id. at 811.
Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law, supra note 51, at 77–78.
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rhetoric that makes certain normative ideas about social relations seem
natural and unproblematic. Therefore, to fully understand and critique this
worldview, the metaphor itself must be taken seriously rather than
continuing in the fashion of most equal protection scholarship where the
colorblind metaphor is treated as superficial language. A more modern and
empirically-grounded understanding of the role of metaphors in orienting
social and political worldviews suggests that we should pay more attention to
its constitutive role in making colorblindness seem like a coherent ideology.
Taking the colorblind metaphor seriously in relation to the
jurisprudence it elicits means, as a first step, examining the claims put forth
by the term itself to understand the cognitive effect it may have on how
individuals experience the world. Recall that the cognitive impacts of
metaphors work by allowing individuals to understand and experience
intangible concepts (such as time) through those that are seemingly
tangible (such as money), allowing them to transfer the emotive and
cognitive experience of the latter onto the former: time is money.
Colorblindness, as a metaphor, suggests: (a) that race is largely about color
or visually obvious differences; (b) that blindness, in terms of not being able
to see or distinguish between racial groups, prevents one from
understanding racial differences in any meaningful way and therefore leads
to a diminished understanding of race that reflects true equality; and (c)
that society can partake in this racial paradise through legal and political
means that mimic this experience of blindness through a jurisprudence of
racial non-recognition. (While the social experience of being blind—i.e.,
not having any vision—is not the same as the experience of being
colorblind—i.e., not being able to properly distinguish colors—the two
concepts, in this context, share an overall framing that not being able to
visually recognize or distinguish between racial groups fosters racial
equality.) In short, the colorblind metaphor gains its coherence from a
particular assumption about race—that it is primarily a visual experience of
engaging with self-evident markers of human difference. This metaphor is
further motivated by a particular assumption regarding the way race plays
out among people with diminished visual capabilities—that it is irrelevant—
to make a normative assertion about how the state ought to approach race,
treating non-recognition as a predicate for achieving a racial utopia that
justifies this move in the doctrinal hermeneutics of equal protection. For
example, Bakke and Richmond turn on eliminating discourses of privilege and
advantage from Whiteness and reframing Whites as a composition of
competing groups whose social experiences are not unlike any other racial
minority; sometimes they win in jockeying for political power, sometimes
they lose. But what makes this “move” possible is a particular theoretical
approach that at once limits race to its most superficial characteristics—
visual cues—that makes the metaphor of blindness through a jurisprudence
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of non-recognition coherent. The embedded “race” ipsa loquitur trope plays
an important cognitive role in allowing race to be conceptualized this way.
To be sure, paying closer attention to colorblindness as a metaphor is
not to say that the social and political transformations in the post Civil
Rights Era are unimportant, nor is it to suggest that the literal phraseology
of colorblindness caused them. Rather, it is to suggest that contemporary
conversations on colorblindness have not taken the metaphor seriously in
terms of the “work” that it does at a cognitive level in giving coherence to
this worldview.
We can perhaps better understand the self-evident
coherence that colorblindness has assumed in equal protection analysis after
63
Richmond v. Croson as the product of an iterative process between
metaphors’ cognitive impact and the aforementioned shifting social and
political contexts that, taken together, (re)create a theory of race that
prioritizes its visual significance en route to a broader jurisprudence of nonrecognition. This approach suggests that sufficient attention has not been
given to fleshing out and critiquing the theory of race that colorblindness
operates from and reproduces: “race” ipsa loquitur.

3. The Intent Doctrine
The intent doctrine is traditionally understood as emerging from the
Supreme Court’s 1976 decision in Washington v. Davis to require a
demonstration of discriminatory purpose or “bad intent” to sustain claims
64
that a facially neutral law or practice violates equal protection.
This
doctrine has made it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to maintain claims of
discrimination; demonstration of disparate impact is not sufficient in and of
itself, and direct evidence of individual decisionmakers’ specific intent to
produce bad outcomes is rare except in the most extraordinary cases.
Yet, this traditional genealogy has recently come under scrutiny for
offering an incomplete understanding of the role of intent analyses in equal
protection race jurisprudence. Moreover, this standard narrative of the
intent doctrine springing out of Washington v. Davis may obscure the critical
role of colorblindness in giving rise to its current incarnation as requiring a
65
specific demonstration of ‘bad intent.’ Ian Haney López argues that what
is missing from the conventional story about the intent doctrine’s origins is
that the judicial examination of intent existed before Washington v. Davis,
but in a different form where social context was used to infer inappropriate

63
64

65

City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
See generally Ian Haney López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec.
2012) (manuscript at 3), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1920418 [hereinafter
López, Intentional Blindness] (challenging the notion of a divided equal protection).
For a persuasive reconsideration of the intent doctrine’s genealogy, see id.
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motives rather than requiring direct evidence of malice. Davis itself drew
attention to this contextual approach to discerning intent. The Davis Court
found that there was no discrimination in the administration of Test 21 as
an examination for promotion within Washington D.C.’s police department
and held that government action is not unconstitutional “solely because it has
67
a racially disproportionate impact.” Yet, context still mattered for the Davis
68
Court in inferring whether or not an unconstitutional purpose existed.
Thus, the Court “did not just extol [this] contextual [method for inferring]
69
intent, [it] employed it, albeit to find no discrimination.”
From this standpoint, Davis did not usher in a jurisprudence fixated on
individual malice. This turn towards malice has been shown to be a postBakke development in equal protection analysis. Recall that Powell’s opinion
in Bakke encouraged deemphasizing context in affirmative action cases in a
manner that subjects all uses of race—remedial or discriminatory—to strict
70
scrutiny and promoted an ethos of non-recognition. While this position
was not signed onto by the other Justices in Bakke, it has become a
formidable influence in equal protection analysis—particularly in
71
transforming intent doctrine.
The year following Bakke, the Court in
66

67
68

69

70
71

López notes:
Returning to the civil rights era, the Court stayed true to this balance between
investigating general motives while eschewing a concern for individual intentions.
It repeatedly drew inferences about governmental purposes from the larger
context, while avoiding direct inquiries into individual mindsets. Sometimes this
inferential process reflected little more than judicial notice of race relations. . . .
At other times, the Justices relied on a more focused examination of surrounding
racial patterns, including through the invocation of social science. Perhaps the
quintessential example is Brown itself, in its famous footnote 12. Whatever the
combination of judicial notice and focused study, the point is that the Court did
not demand direct proof of subjective mindsets.
Instead, findings of
discriminatory purpose reflected inferences drawn from the challenged action as
well as the surrounding context—in a phrase popular with the Court, from the
“totality of the circumstances.”
Id. at 18–19 (internal footnotes omitted).
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (emphasis in original).
“Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality
of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one
race than another . . . . Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.” Id. at
242.
López, Intentional Blindness, supra note 65 at 29. Justice White wrote in Davis:
Even agreeing with the District Court that the differential racial effect of Test 21
called for further inquiry, we think the District Court correctly held that the
affirmative efforts of the Metropolitan Police Department to recruit black officers,
the changing racial composition of the recruit classes and of the force in general,
and the relationship of the test to the training program negated any inference that
the Department discriminated on the basis of race or that “a police officer
qualifies on the color of his skin rather than ability.”
Davis, 426 U.S. at 246 (internal citations omitted).
See infra Part IIB.2.
See generally López, Intentional Blindness, supra note 65.
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Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney relied heavily upon Powell’s
colorblind logic to assert—in a case that was actually about gender
discrimination—that “a racial classification, regardless of purported
motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an
72
extraordinary justification.” Feeney shifted the constitutional problem to
that of classification itself; the context that mattered so much up through
and past Davis was now reduced to an immediately suspect act of
government classifying or “seeing” individuals’ ostensibly superficial traits,
73
where the Court asserted that “[r]ace is the paradigm.” But Feeney also
reconfigured the meaning of discriminatory purpose or intent:
Discriminatory purpose . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent
as
awareness
of
consequences.
It
implies
that
the
decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at
least in part “because of,” not merely “in spite of,” its adverse effects upon
74
an identifiable group.

This has led several commentators to conclude that Feeney initiated a
doctrinal requirement of demonstrating “bad intent” to sustain claims that
75
equal protection has been violated. But what has been underappreciated
until recently is the extent to which the shift in equal protection analysis
from contextual inquiries to an acontextual emphasis on categorization and
malice stems from the Court embracing colorblindness; framing the equal
protection problem as one of classification or merely “seeing” race is to
embrace and extend blindness as an interpretive model. Thus, the intent
76
doctrine as we currently know it is conceptually linked to colorblindness; its
current iteration and emphasis on malice is fruit from the poisonous
colorblind tree.
What occurs is an increasingly decontextualized
understanding of race and racism that moves them from being understood
through contextual interactions between human difference and social
structure to a reductionist emphasis on physical traits—the Feeney Court’s
“adverse effects upon an identifiable group”—whereby categorization in bad
faith is privileged yet race itself remains undertheorized and conceptually
flattened to something that is presumptively self-evident or obvious. Put
differently, in disaggregating race from context or social structure, the Court
effectively embraces “race” ipsa loquitur as its theory of race. Race needs no
contextual explanation or investigation. It simply speaks for itself.
72
73
74
75

76

Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272.
Id. at 279 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
See e.g., Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of StatusEnforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1135 (1997) [hereinafter Siegel, Why Equal
Protection No Longer Protects].
See López, Intentional Blindness, supra note 65.
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Taken together, this Part’s main doctrinal point is that the Court’s equal
protection jurisprudence has evolved in a manner where race is conceptually
reduced to a series of discrete, self-evidently “identifiable” categories that are
salient on their own terms that are known by mere visual observation. What
happens across all three areas—the scrutiny inquiry, colorblindness, and the
intent doctrine—is the development of a reductionist account of race that
promotes a sociologically “thin” understanding of how and why race
becomes salient. By removing context, all that is left is mere visual
difference; categories based on such seemingly self-evident differences
become the bulk of inquiry rather than the context and social practices that
make difference visible in the first place. I challenge this notion that racial
difference is self-evidently salient or knowable through an empirical model
that asks “How do blind people understand race?” By doing this, we can
empirically explore the accuracy of the “race” ipsa loquitur claim. The
empirical inquiry allows for examining how and why social practices become
key to understanding the salience of race and thus why context must be put
back into the mix not simply as a matter of justice, but also for the Court to
work with empirically robust understandings of race. However, before
discussing the empirical findings, it is useful to examine how the “race” ipsa
loquitur understanding of race has also affected equal protection scholarship.

C. Scholarly Approaches to Modern Equal Protection Law
Part IV will discuss some of the existing scholarly critiques pertaining to
the scrutiny inquiry, colorblindness, and the intent doctrine to situate the
contribution made by this Article’s empirical critique of the “race” ipsa
loquitur trope in equal protection law. This section, however, will take a step
back to examine how equal protection scholars have broadly conceived of
race in order to highlight the synergies between equal protection
scholarship and doctrine: both embrace “race” ipsa loquitur, or the idea that
the salience of race stems from its self-evident visual character. The small set
of articles examined in this section are by no means representative of the
vast equal protection literature. Rather, I briefly look at a limited number of
influential equal protection articles to broadly sketch how race has been
traditionally theorized in this literature.
The modern scholarly conversation surrounding equal protection has
most famously been an appendage of what Alexander Bickel called the
77
countermajoritarian difficulty, or the concern created when judicial review
is used by individuals that are not democratically elected to ostensibly thwart
77

See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (assessing the merits of the Court’s decisions and
analyzing the role of the Court).
AT THE
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78

the majoritarian will of the governed. The countermajoritarian difficulty is
far from only an equal protection problem; the debates go back to the very
founding of this country in terms of figuring out the appropriate role of
unelected judges in a democratic society. Yet the tension between the
countermajoritarian difficulty and equal protection has led to scholarship
that fleshes out how race has been conceptualized among equal protection
scholars.
To describe the vast and rich scholarship on the countermajoritarian
difficulty is beyond this Article’s scope. But, it is useful to sketch some of the
key arguments made by influential scholars to use as guideposts to gauge
how equal protection scholarship has theorized race and discrimination as
primarily visual phenomena and the impact this has for the underlying
architecture of the jurisprudence. Probably the most celebrated post-Bickel
engagement with issues pertaining to judicial review, equal protection, and
countermajoritarianism is John Hart Ely’s Democracy and Distrust. Here, Ely
riffs off of Footnote Four in Carolene Products to advance a theory of judicial
review that focuses on process rather than substantive values. In other
79
words, he frames “the court as referee.” While Ely provides an eloquent
discussion of how his process theory of judicial review interacts with the
challenges posed by equal protection, his engagement with the moral
imperative driving modern equal protection jurisprudence—that
discrimination against discrete and insular minorities is particularly
troublesome—is less than robust.
Ely argues that “only ‘racelike’
80
classifications should be regarded as suspect,” without providing a
complete concept of what race is (outside of equal protection’s historical
commitment to protecting Blacks) before exploring the traits that make a
characteristic sufficiently similar.
Put differently, race goes without
meaningful definition. As a result, the implication is that Ely draws upon a

78

79
80

Barry Friedman argues that “[t]he ‘countermajoritarian difficulty’ [is] the central
obsession of modern constitutional scholarship.” Barry Friedman, The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
333, 334 (1998) [hereinafter Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty]
(footnote omitted). He sums up the concerns surrounding this concept as “the problem
of justifying the exercise of judicial review by unelected and ostensibly unaccountable
judges in what we otherwise deem to be a political democracy.” Barry Friedman, The Birth
of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE
L.J. 153, 155 (2002) [hereinafter Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession]. “[T]o the
extent that democracy entails responsiveness to popular will, how to explain a branch of
government whose members are unaccountable to the people, yet have the power to
overturn popular decisions?” Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty,
Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, supra note 79, at 335 (footnote omitted).
See generally, JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW,
chapter 4 (1980).
Id. at 149.
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lay understanding that race is visually obvious (suggesting that it needs no
meaningful discussion outside of what is seen) to then theoretically explore
what makes a potential classification race-like. Ely sees problems with both
81
82
the traditional “discrete and insular” and immutability approaches to
understanding which classifications are suspect. Rather, Ely argues that we
83
should shift our focus to how prejudice “is a lens that distorts reality” and
thus unduly alters the political process in a way that justifies judicial review.
By this reasoning, prejudice is an exogenous social factor anterior to the
political process rather than something embedded within; the process itself
is presumptively pure. The role of courts through judicial review then is to
“look not simply to the legislative product here, but to the process that
generated it, to see whether it can identify some factor or factors that
84
suggest the likelihood of such legislative misapprehension.”
Bruce Ackerman’s Beyond Carolene Products pursues a close reading of
Carolene Products (without substantively engaging other cases) to take
another look at the countermajoritarian difficulty through the lens of equal
protection. For Ackerman, the brilliance of Carolene Products is that it
“reverse[s] the spin of the countermajoritarian difficulty” by showing that
“the original legislative decision, not the judicial invalidation, suffers the
85
greater legitimacy deficit.”
Nevertheless, Ackerman finds that “a
reappraisal of Carolene is a pressing necessity [since] its approach to minority

81

82

83
84
85

Ely interprets Justice Stone’s use of discrete and insular minorities in footnote four of
Carolene Products to reference:
[T]he sort of “pluralist” wheeling and dealing by which the various minorities that
make up our society typically interact to protect their interests, and constituted an
attempt to denote those minorities for which such a system of “mutual defense
pacts” will prove recurrently unavailing. But even understood thus, a “discrete and
insular minorities” approach, at least one that refuses to attend to why the minority
in question is discrete and insular, also turns out to be less than entirely tenable.
Perhaps the most obvious objection is one it is always easy to make, that courts
aren’t qualified to engage in this kind of practical political analysis.
Id. at 151.
Ely notes:
[N]o one has bothered to build the logical bridge, to tell us exactly why we should
be suspicious of legislatures that classify on the basis of immutable characteristics.
Surely one has to feel sorry for a person disabled by something that he or she can’t
do anything about, but I’m not aware of any reason to suppose that elected
officials are unusually unlikely to share that feeling.
Id. at 150. But see id. at 154–55, where he concedes that:
The ability to frame the point of a classification harming (or subsidizing) a certain
group in terms of a desire to discourage people from joining (or encourage
people to join) that group obviously depends on the mutability of the
characteristic that forms the basis of classification. . . . Immutability thus cannot be
the talisman that some have tried to make it, but it isn’t entirely irrelevant
either. . . .
Id. at 153.
Id. at 157.
Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715 (1985).
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rights is profoundly shaped by the old politics of exclusion and yields sys86
tematically misleading cues within the new participatory paradigm.” Key to
this argument is Ackerman’s belief that being a member of a discrete and
insular minority is actually advantageous within a democratic political
system, suggesting that the moral impetus of Carolene Products is at best
87
outdated and at worst theoretically misguided.
Although Ackerman recognizes that Blacks are the “paradigmatic
Carolene group,” he offers neither a theory of race nor a broader
understanding of why Carolene groups are particularly important outside of
history and the persistence of prejudice against minorities. He defines “a
minority as ‘discrete’ when its members are marked out in ways that make it
relatively easy for others to identify them. For instance, there is nothing a
88
black woman may plausibly do to hide the fact that she is black or female.”
It is from this visual understanding of race that Ackerman argues that Blacks
are in a strong position to leverage the machinery of pluralist politics to
89
their advantage.
The real focus of judicial review from his perspective
should be “the anonymous and diffuse victims of poverty and sexual
discrimination who find it most difficult to protect their fundamental
90
interests through effective political organization.”
Similar to Ely, the
implied theory driving this perspective is that race is a visually obvious fact;

86
87

88
89

90

Id. at 717.
Ackerman argues:
Carolene is utterly wrongheaded in its diagnosis. Other things being equal,
“discreteness and insularity” will normally be a source of enormous bargaining
advantage, not disadvantage, for a group engaged in pluralist American politics.
Except for special cases, the concerns that underlie Carolene should lead judges to
protect groups that possess the opposite characteristics from the ones Carolene
emphasizes—groups that are “anonymous and diffuse” rather than “discrete and
insular.” It is these groups that both political science and American history
indicate are systematically disadvantaged in a pluralist democracy.
Id. at 723–24.
Id. at 729 (emphasis added).
Ackerman notes that:
[A]s long as we use Carolene rhetoric to express our constitutional concerns with
racial equality . . . we will find ourselves saying things that are increasingly belied
by political reality. While constitutional lawyers decry the political powerlessness
of discrete and insular groups, representatives of these interests will be wheeling
and dealing in the ongoing pluralist exchange—winning some battles, losing
others, but plainly numbering among the organized interests whose electoral
power must be treated with respect by their bargaining partners and competitors.
Gradually, this clash between constitutional rhetoric and political reality can have
only one result. As time goes by, the constitutional center will not hold: the
longer Carolene remains at the core of the constitutional case for judicial review,
the harder lawyers will find it to convince themselves, let alone others, that judicial
protection for the rights of “discrete and insular minorities” makes constitutional
sense.
Id. at 745.
Id.
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nothing, especially not law, constitutes the ability to see racial difference. It
simply is.
In another law review article that focuses its attention on a close reading
of Carolene Products, Robert Cover’s The Origins of Judicial Activism in the
Protection of Minorities provides an insightful discussion of the relationship
between race, equal protection, and countermajoritarianism. Yet Cover also
fails to provide a substantive theory of vision as applied to race to
understand what it is about discreteness (and to a lesser extent insularity)
that justifies giving these groups special protections. Rather than exploring
the theoretical implications of being a group that visually stands out for
majoritarianism, the experiences of minorities are used to justify judicial
review as a check upon apartheid. Cover frames racism as what is done to a
group of people whereby race—largely characterized as the visually obvious
human differences between minority and majority groups—is seen as the
motivating factor, the so-called trigger for group conflict. Cover notes:
Apartheid was not, however, hysteria. It was the governing system that
pervaded half the country, and like any such system it was implicitly and
explicitly supported by the Constitution. It is clear to me that when
Stone wrote [F]ootnote [F]our he intended to protect against transitory
hysteria. It is not clear to me whether he knew he had also embarked on
a program to rewrite the Constitution. . . . [W]hether or not the
[F]ootnote is a wholly coherent theory, it captures the constitutional
experience of the period from 1954 to 1964. And that experience, more
91
than the logic of any theory, is the validating force in law.

Cover’s pragmatic or experience-based view of Carolene Products’
influence is certainly convincing; the urgent social contexts of the period
did not lend themselves to a moment of deep reflection and theoretical
ruminations. Rather, people were being slaughtered abroad, and Jim Crow
was entrenching itself at home. Discrete and insular minorities, in this
92
sense, are what they do.
Yet the effect is still nonetheless important:
emphasizing the pragmatic concerns of the debate between race, judicial

91
92

Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J.
1287, 1316 (1982).
Cover argues that:
“[D]iscrete and insular” minorities are not simply losers in the political arena, they
are perpetual losers. Indeed, to say that they lose in the majoritarian political
process is seriously to distort the facts: they are scapegoats in the real political
struggles between other groups. Moreover, in their “insularity” such groups may
be characteristically helpless, passive victims of the political process. It is,
therefore, because of the discreteness and insularity of certain minorities (objects
of prejudice) that we cannot trust “the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.” A more searching judicial
scrutiny is thus superimposed upon the structural protections against “factions”
relied on by the original Constitution—the diffusion of political power and checks
and balances.
Id. at 1296.
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review, and countermajoritarianism reifies lay renditions of the presumed
visual obviousness of race as unproblematic. In the absence of a more
substantive theory of race, we are left to fall back on its lay significance as the
obvious visible divisions between humans known by phenotype.
Another string of relevant scholarship looks descriptively and
normatively at the underlying theories motivating judicial review of “discrete
and insular” minorities, skirting the broader issues that make the judicial
review of certain types of legislative classifications particularly important.
Paul Brest set out a passionate defense of the antidiscrimination principle in
a 1977 Harvard Law Review piece, a principle that he describes as
“disfavor[ing] race-dependent decisions and conduct—at least when they
93
selectively disadvantage the members of a minority group.”
Racedependent decisions are those that “would have been different but for the
race of those benefited or disadvantaged by them . . . including overt racial
94
classifications on the face of statutes and covert decisions by officials.” This
principle embraces a mainstream process theory of judicial review that
supports incremental approaches to resolving discrimination that focus on
individuals and classifications while being skeptical of reasoning backwards
from racial groups’ disparate outcomes to infer unconstitutional
discrimination. From this perspective, race is only important in as far as it
95
affects how individuals treat one another, not group status dynamics.
From this antidiscrimination perspective of the engagement of judicial
96
review with equal protection doctrine, race is merely a trait that individuals
possess. Indeed, Brest tautologically defines his usage of race in this essay as
“a shorthand for race and ethnic origin . . . [reserving the argument that]
the antidiscrimination principle can be and has been extended to
97
encompass a variety of other traits.” Thus, the unarticulated theory of race
93
94
95

96

97

Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1976).
Id.
Brest asserts that:
[T]he fact is that most injuries of discrimination . . . were inflicted on particular
persons and only they are entitled to compensation. Where discrimination has
undermined the unity or culture of a group, it may be appropriate to characterize
the injury as one to the group; but the appropriate remedy then is one that
reestablishes the group, an end that is not promoted by the fiction of treating
individual members as its agents.
Id. at 52.
Brest notes:
The antidiscrimination principle rests on fundamental moral values that are
widely shared in our society. Although the text and legislative history of laws that
incorporate this principle can inform our understanding of it, the principle itself
is at least as likely to inform our interpretations of the laws. This is especially true
with respect to the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment.
Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
Id.
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used here reflects what can be seen across doctrinal and scholarly race
conversations: lay understandings of race based primarily on visual cues can
be unproblematically imported into legal discussions in a manner that
reifies its presumed visually obvious characteristics.
Owen Fiss provides an alternative principle to guide judicial review of
equal protection cases that implicate race:
a group disadvantaging
principle, also described as anti-subordination. Fiss offers this approach in
98
the context of a philosophical engagement rather than doctrinal discussion
as both an alternative to and critique of the mainstream antidiscrimination
99
principle that largely reflects the Court’s approach. Fiss argues that:
[T]he antidiscrimination principle embodies a very limited conception
of equality, one that is highly individualistic and confined to assessing the
rationality of means . . . [in contrast to an anti-subordination approach,
which] takes a fuller account of social reality, and . . . more clearly
100
focuses the issues that must be decided in equal protection cases.

One of Fiss’s central arguments is that “[u]nder the antidiscrimination
principle, the constitutional flaw inheres in the structure of the statute or
101
the conduct of the administrator, not in its impact on any group or class.”
This preoccupation with individual transactions and classificatory burdens
on persons rather than groups bothers Fiss, leading to the development of a
group disadvantaging principle to guide constitutional thought. Fiss is
careful to articulate that “[t]he overarching idea of the antisubordination
principle is that certain social practices . . . should be condemned not

98

99

100
101

Fiss published this article in a philosophy journal, not a law review. Therefore, the
discussion of case law is scant, with a heavier emphasis on having a more nuanced
discussion of the underlying theories of antidiscrimination and anti-subordination. Owen
M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976).
Fiss argues that “[a]ntidiscrimination has been the predominant interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause. The examples I have given are cast primarily in terms of race,
but the principle also controls cases that do not involve race. It is the general
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause . . . .” Fiss, supra note 99, at 118. But see
Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or
Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003), in which the authors argue that the
presumed jurisprudential dominance of the antidiscrimination or anticlassification
approach is not all that clear:
[W]e challenge the common assumption that . . . the anticlassification principle
triumphed over the antisubordination principle. We argue instead that the scope
of the two principles overlap, that their application shifts over time in response to
social contestation and social struggle, and that antisubordination values have
shaped the historical development of anticlassification understandings.
Fiss, supra note 99, at 108.
Id. at 127. Fiss continues on to say:
Any individual who happens to be burdened by a statute or practice, or any
individual excluded from the benefits, can complain of the wrong. . . . But, the
individual’s entitlement to relief is not dependent on the interests or desires of
others similarly subject to or excluded from the statute or practice.
Id.
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because of any unfairness in the transaction attributable to the poor fit
between means and ends, but rather because such practices create or
perpetuate the subordination of the group of which the individual excluded
102
or rejected is a member.”
103
While Fiss provides a more theoretically compelling understanding of
how judicial review should approach racial discrimination and its group
impact, his theory of race is similar to those he criticizes. Race as a social and
legal concept deserves no special theoretical attention outside of lay
understandings that it reflects human differences known primarily through
observing phenotypical variation and visual observation. Indeed, Fiss notes
that:
[T]here are natural classes, or social groups, in American society and
blacks are such a group. Blacks are viewed as a group; they view
themselves as a group; their identity is in large part determined by
membership in the group; their social status is linked to the status of the
group; and much of our action, institutional and personal, is based on
104
these perspectives.

This understanding of natural classes does not explicitly articulate a
visual understanding of race. However, in the absence of specifying a theory
of race, Fiss’s argument presumptively works from lay understandings of race
that take visual distinctions as a common sense boundary between racial
groups. It goes without saying only because it is a deeply ingrained belief in
our society. What Fiss sees as “natural classes”—human divisions that exist
apart from any social influences—speaks to an unarticulated theory of how
he primarily knows these divisions or what makes them salient: visual cues.
This is not to conflate natural understandings of race with visual ones or wed
them too strongly. Rather, it is to point out their relationship and how
visual understandings of race are often implied without an explicit
articulation. Such “race” ipsa loquitur approaches where race speaks for itself
are not uncommon in equal protection discussions; in many ways, they
reflect the norm. It is a shared assumption across equal protection doctrine
102
103

104

Owen Fiss, Another Equality, 2 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 3–4 (2004).
Fiss’s group disadvantaging principle as a way to rethink equal protection is strongly
grounded in Blacks’ social reality:
The conception of blacks as a social group is only the first step in constructing a
mediating principle. We must also realize they are a very special type of social
group. They have two other characteristics as a group that are critical in
understanding the function and reach of the Equal Protection Clause. One is that
blacks are very badly off, probably our worst-off class (in terms of material wellbeing second only to the American Indians), and in addition they have occupied
the lowest rung for several centuries. In a sense, they are America’s perpetual
underclass. It is both of these characteristics—the relative position of the group
and the duration of the position—that make efforts to improve the status of the
group defensible.
Fiss, supra note 93, at 150.
Id. at 148 (emphasis added).
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and most scholarly conversations that race reflects a series of discrete
categories of human difference that are external to legal processes and are
known simply by looking out into the world.
Other scholars have presented additional guiding principles for the
judicial review of equal protection cases implicating race—all with the
undertone of how to effectively manage countermajoritarian concerns. Cass
Sunstein presents an anticaste principle—somewhat similar to Fiss’s group
disadvantaging principle—that “forbids social and legal practices from
translating highly visible and morally irrelevant differences into systemic
105
social disadvantage, unless there is a very good reason for society to do so.”
Taking race as his paradigmatic example, Sunstein does not provide further
theoretical elucidation on his conception of race and its relevance to this
anticaste principle other than to say “a special problem of inequality arises
when members of a group suffer from a range of disadvantages because of a
group-based characteristic that is both visible for all to see and irrelevant from
106
a moral point of view.”
This approach to race, which frames its legal
significance in the visual cues that trigger certain discriminatory responses
that are unconstitutional, is par for the course with regards to scholarly and
doctrinal conversations on race and equal protection.
Race and
discrimination are seen as problems inhering in bodies that, when visually
observed, can spark discriminatory responses. For example, Sunstein argues
that:
Because the stigmatizing characteristic is highly visible, it will probably
trigger reactions from others in a wide variety of spheres, even in the
interstices of everyday life. Highly visible characteristics are especially
likely to be a basis for statistical discrimination and to fuel prejudice from
third parties. . . . It is for this reason that the argument I am making
works best when the morally irrelevant characteristic is highly visible.
When the characteristic is not highly visible, we cannot have a caste
system as I understand it here, though the translation into disadvantage

105

106

Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2412 (1994) (emphasis
added). Sunstein further describes this principle:
This principle grows out of the original rejection of the monarchical legacy and
the explicit constitutional ban on titles of nobility. The principle was fueled by the
Civil War Amendments and the New Deal. The opposition should be understood
as an effort to eliminate, in places large and small, the caste system rooted in race
and gender. A law is therefore objectionable on grounds of equality if it
contributes to such a caste system. The controlling principle is that no group may
be made into second-class citizens. Instead of asking “Are blacks or women
similarly situated to whites or men, and if so have they been treated differently?”
we should ask “Does the law or practice in question contribute to the maintenance
of second-class citizenship, or lower-caste status, for blacks or women?”
Id. at 2428–29 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 2411–12 (emphasis added).
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of a morally irrelevant but invisible characteristic can raise important
107
equality concerns as well.

This analysis highlights how much of the conversation around judicial
review’s approach to race and equal protection not only embraces a lay
theory of race largely defined by visual cues, but works from a concept where
the moral justification for stronger forms of judicial solicitude largely depends
upon the notion that race is what we see. If any one component has come to
structure how courts define race and understand their moral and legal
obligations to remedy racial discrimination, it is the visual aspect of race
(skin color, hair texture, facial features, etc.), if only because the conception
of race in law reflects that of society.
Other scholars—notably critical race theorists—have critiqued this
mainstream conversation concerning race and equal protection law and
have given race a complexity and thoughtfulness that is often missing within
the equal protection orthodoxy. Critical race theory’s (“CRT”) main
contribution has been to challenge mainstream legal narratives that frame
race and racism as aberrational social experiences and to highlight the ways
that racial subordination is central to law. Part of this approach includes
examining the previously widespread notion that race reflects natural or
biological differences between groups by demonstrating how social and legal
forces construct racial meanings. In this vein, this scholarship has shed light
on law’s role in constructing race and racial meanings and, moreover, how
the failure to take this perspective seriously can further entrench inequality.
Neil Gotanda’s A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind” exemplifies this
scholarship. Gotanda unpacks colorblindness as an ideology perpetrated by
the Court to reveal four distinct meanings: status race (race representing
status in society), formal race (socially constructed formal categories, such as
“Black” and “White”), historical race (subordinating relationship between
races, both past and present), and culture race (race as culture, community,
108
and consciousness).
Gotanda notes that “American racial classifications
follow two formal rules: 1) Rule of recognition: any person whose Black109
African ancestry is visible is Black [and] 2) Rule of descent.” Gotanda does
not provide an extended critique of this first rule (which reflects this
project’s “race” ipsa loquitur thesis), but does highlight the difficulty of
finding explicit articulations (doctrinal, scholarly, or otherwise) where he
discusses the significance of visual cues to discussions of race and law:
One way to begin a critique of the American system of racial classification
is to ask “Who is Black?” This question rarely provokes analysis; its
answer is seen as so self-evident that challenges are novel and noteworthy.
107
108
109

Id. at 2432–33.
See generally Gotanda, supra note 32.
Id. at 24 (emphasis altered).
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Americans no longer have need of a system of judicial screening to
decide a person’s race; the rules are simply absorbed without explicit
110
articulation.

Yet, like much scholarship in this area, there are no further thoughts on
how race becomes visually salient.

D. Theory of Race Emanating from Equal Protection Doctrine and
Scholarship
The review of the doctrinal development of equal protection law and its
surrounding scholarship suggests an important yet largely unarticulated
trend. In relation to the inordinate attention paid to thinking through the
difficulties and appropriate relationship between equal protection and
judicial review, race has been conceptually reduced to its lowest common
denominator: a set of discrete and visually obvious categories primarily
known by phenotype and other visual cues. Thus, an important theory of
race embedded throughout equal protection jurisprudence is that race
speaks for itself; race is what you see, and what you see is salient and striking for
self-evident reasons. “Seeing” race is understood as a fact of life that is
exogenous to any broader social, legal, or political process. Moreover, this
exogenous variable is thought to be the trigger giving rise to equal
protection conversations.
By saying that equal protection doctrine and mainstream scholarship
have a reductionist theory of race, I do not mean to simply reassert that race
is socially or legally constructed, a point that has already been eloquently
111
made.
Instead, I want to extend this conversation by questioning the
extent to which visual distinctions between racial groups are thought to be
self-evident boundaries of difference. Law’s focus on visibility might
privilege a certain way of thinking about race that historically has been
intertwined with racial subordination, i.e., that racial differences are real,
tangible, and obvious rather than a product of social practices. Thus, the
“race” ipsa loquitur trope in equal protection doctrine may very well limit
discussions of what race is and, more importantly, might obscure the most
effective way to use racial categorizations in a thoughtful, non-discriminatory
manner. Given these stakes, an empirical examination might provide
insight into the relationship between race and vision, drawing attention to

110
111

Id. at 23–24.
See, e.g., Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion,
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994) [hereinafter López, The Social
Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice]; LAURA E. GÓMEZ,
MANIFEST DESTINIES: THE MAKING OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN RACE (2007); Aliya
Saperstein & Andrew M. Penner, The Race of a Criminal Record: How Incarceration Colors
Racial Perceptions, 57 SOC. PROBS. 92 (2010).
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the extent that visual understandings of race may not arise out of their
obviousness but from constitutive social practices that create their salience.
The results from this empirical research that flesh out this concept are
discussed in Part III.
112

III. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
A. Research Design

The purpose of this research is to determine whether the theory of race
embedded in equal protection doctrine is empirically defensible: that the
salience of race, and the legally cognizable trigger for discriminatory
behavior, stems from its self-evident visual significance. Put differently, is
race salient on the terms articulated by the Court, i.e., because it is visually
obvious? Or does this visual understanding of race (and the discriminatory
behavior that equal protection sees as tightly connected with it) emanate
from something else, which might suggest that the Court’s understanding of
the salience of race with regards to the scrutiny inquiry, colorblindness, and
the intent doctrine is inherently flawed? To test whether the visual salience
of race comes from its purported obviousness, we can use qualitative
methods to examine the experiences of those without vision or the ability to
visually distinguish between racial groups: people who are totally blind, and
have been so since birth. Focusing on this population (as opposed to
including those who are partially sighted or lost their vision later in life) is
conceptually important; it allows for a particular understanding of whether
the absence of vision affects individuals’ perceptions of race. Individuals
with partial sight can sometimes see certain physical traits while those who
lose their sight as a child, adolescent, or adult may have residual visual
memories of race that may confound the research results. Talking to people
who have never been capable of seeing the physical attributes associated
with race and comparing these experiences to those of sighted people offers
the best way to examine whether there are influences beyond the presumed
self-evident character of race that lead it to be primarily understood in visual
terms. This aspect of the methodological design is key: since blind and sighted
individuals live in similar social contexts, the environment or social practices
112

The dataset presented in this section differs significantly from the dataset presented in a
previous article. Here, I have substantially expanded the number of blind and sighted
respondents to offer findings that draw upon a richer set of data. This Article is also
distinguished in that I discuss and apply the findings from this expanded dataset to a
specific constitutional discussion regarding the “race” ipsa loquitur idea embedded in equal
protection jurisprudence and scholarship. See generally Osagie K. Obasogie, Do Blind
People See Race? Social, Legal, and Theoretical Considerations, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 585
(2010).
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can be held constant so as to empirically test the relevance of the main
variable—vision—in relation to the visual salience of race.
For this Article, interviews with sighted individuals help empirically
ground the motivating hypothesis—that sighted people primarily think
visually about race—in order to draw similarities to the experiences of the
main group under study, i.e., blind individuals. This comparison, and the
use of sighted people in particular, allows this Article to unearth thoroughly
unexamined and unchallenged assumptions throughout society that are
reflected in equal protection law: that race is uniquely salient because of
visual distinctions, that this visual significance is self-evident and exogenous
to social forces, and that race therefore has diminished or even no
importance for blind people.
113
I conducted 161 interviews with blind respondents, with 106 qualifying
114
The fifty-five non-qualifying interviews with
as totally blind since birth.
people who had some sight or lost their vision as a child, adolescent, or
115
adult were not included in the results.

113

114

115

These interviews were primarily conducted by telephone for three reasons. First, it
significantly diversified the sample. Second, many of the blind respondents do not live
independently; talking by phone increased their comfort and ability to participate.
Third, conducting all of the interviews by phone meant that sighted respondents could
not see the interviewer, which reduced the chance that their visual perception of me
would introduce interviewer bias. If any bias was transmitted over the phone by the
perception of having a racialized voice or surname, such bias would likely be uniform
across blind and sighted respondents, making the data more comparable.
Interviews with both blind and sighted respondents were semi-structured. The interview
questions were largely the same for both groups, but additional questions were
occasionally asked to follow up on points made by the respondents or to allow them to
clarify their answers. Both sets of respondents were identified through snowball
sampling. For example, I started with three blind respondents identified through
personal contacts and asked each of them to put me in contact with three additional
blind people, and then repeated this process. Blind respondents were also identified
through Internet listserv postings.
So that the experiences between the two groups were comparable, I tried to roughly
balance various demographic categories such as respondents’ average age (44.5 years for
blind respondents versus 47.1 years for sighted respondents) and proportions of White to
non-White respondents (83.9% of the blind respondents identified as White and 16%
identified as non-White, compared to 68% of the sighted respondents that identified as
White and 32% that identified as non-White).
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TABLE 1: SAMPLE INFORMATION
Total Interviewed

Qualifying
Respondents

White

Non-White

Avg.
Age

Male/
Female

States

161

106

89

17

44.5

34

(83.9%)*

(16%)*

51/55
(48.1%/
51.8%)

17

8 (32%)*

47.1

7/18
(28%/
72%)

6

Blind

Sighted

25

25

(68%)*

*of qualifying respondents

The telephone interviews were recorded (with consent from each
respondent) and transcribed by a third party. HyperResearch qualitative
research software was used to code and analyze the data.

B. Results

116

Two specific questions frame the findings from this research. First, how
do blind and sighted individuals understand race? Secondly, if blind people
understand race visually, how does this occur?

1. Sighted and Blind Respondents’ Visual Understanding of Race
Sighted individuals largely have a visual understanding of race, meaning
that visually obvious physical differences—skin color, facial features, etc.—
shape how they understand the boundaries that give salience to racial
groupings. This finding is strongly supported by the qualitative data
116

Pseudonyms are used throughout the reporting of this data to conceal the respondents’
identities. Qualitative researchers, particularly those using interview methodologies,
often report their data using quasi-quantitative descriptors, e.g., “many,” “most,” “few,”
etc., as opposed to numerical counts or proportions. This is done to resist the
overquantification of human dynamics that can undermine the richness of qualitative
data. I follow this approach in reporting the results in this Article. See ROBERT S. WEISS,
LEARNING FROM STRANGERS: THE ART AND METHOD OF QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW STUDIES
(1994). See also, e.g., MARY C. WATERS, ETHNIC OPTIONS: CHOOSING IDENTITIES IN
AMERICA (1990); RUTH FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE MATTERS: THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF WHITENESS (1993); KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY:
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS (1988); PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE
COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998).
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collected for this Article, and should not be surprising. Similarly, sighted
respondents’ almost uniform belief that blind people have a diminished
understanding of race due to their inability to see should not be particularly
118
perplexing.
But what is surprising is that blind and sighted people
understand and experience race in a similar fashion: visually.
The data overwhelmingly show that, contrary to beliefs within the
sighted community, race is not only significant to blind people, but is
visually salient as a marker of visually distinguishable physical traits such as
skin color and facial features. Put differently, the visual aspects of race are
what give it conceptual salience and significance to blind people—just as
much as it does to their sighted counterparts. The qualitative data
conclusively bears this out. For example, when asked what race is, blind
respondent Amy notes that it “is physical attributes that are inherently
unique to a group of people.” Other blind respondents put a finer point on
this idea. Denny said, “race [is] skin color—color of one’s pigmentation,”
while Brian said that for him, “race [is used] to distinguish Black, White,
Asian, Hispanic . . . [based on] skin color.” Carrie similarly said “I think of
colors. Varying colors in people’s skin colors.” Several blind respondents
acknowledged the irony in their emphasis on visual cues in conceptualizing
racial difference. Tyrone responded by saying race is “color. Even though I
can’t see, that is what I tend to think of.” When asked what is the first thing
that comes to mind when she hears the word “race,” Ginny said, “oddly I
guess I would say skin color. Even though that’s not really relevant to me.
But that’s the first thing that comes to mind.”
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When asked how to define race, almost every sighted respondent emphasized visual
differences as the key distinguishing factor. One sighted respondent, Mallory, noted,
“there are lots of different races, although when I say race [I mean] different colors of
people.” Another sighed respondent, Angie, said “obviously color of skin can come into
play. Just physical characteristics of race. Hispanics typically have jet black hair. Asians
have . . . the almond slanted eye. Just those type of things. Again, dark hair. Black,
obviously color of skin.”
When asked about their thoughts on blind people’s ability to comprehend race, one
sighted respondent, Sarah, said if “they’ve been blind all their life, they probably don’t
have any idea what [sighted people are] talking about when we say [race]. I don’t think
they have any concept of it.” When asked if she thought race is a problem for blind
people, another sighted respondent, Jenny, said, “It shouldn’t be. I don’t think so. I
don’t see how it could be.” Even those few sighted respondents who thought blind
people might understand race thought that this understanding would be impoverished,
or at least not visually significant to them. For example, sighted respondent Donny said
that he thought race might be important to blind people since “yes there is a physical
difference there but at the same time there is a cultural difference that can be identified
more so than pure color.” Similarly, Jamie thought that race might be significant to blind
people despite their inability to see “because people sound different, and people act
differently. [If] they’ve been taught to fear [these distinctions], then they’ll fear it.”
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This visual understanding of race also affects blind individuals’ own
racial identities. That is, blind people’s racial identities are shaped by a
visual understanding of their own physical features that they cannot directly
perceive. For example, when asked if he racially identified a particular way,
Nelson replied “I know that I was created with white skin, and that I’m
White, but that’s just a fact of life.” Mark said that he identified as White
because “I know who I am, I know what I look like, so I’m White.” Tara
similarly noted that “I am Caucasian, but I don’t know if that has anything
but skin, meaning to me. Only the fact that I am.” These types of answers
were not unique to White blind respondents as the racial identity of blind
racial minorities also revolved around an awareness of how they are visually
perceived. For example, Alex said that he identified as African American
because “I [am] a little dark-skinned.” Larry, another blind Black
respondent, said he identified as Black because “I’m a dark skinned
guy. . . . I’m a dark skinned brother with kinky hair and all the other basic
Negroid features and all that good stuff.” Amy says she identifies as African
American because “I have the attributes . . . you know, I definitely have the
thick hair and dark skin myself.” When asked why he identified as Black,
Tim laughed in acknowledging the irony of his response, and said “skin
color.”
This data begins to demonstrate the visual salience that race has for
blind individuals, both in terms of how they racially identify others and
themselves. It is tempting to conclude that these responses only reflect a
relatively superficial understanding of race among blind people that is
indicative of a general awareness that people come in different colors. But,
the visual understanding of race within the blind community is, as it is in the
sighted community, more complicated than this. Race is not simply about
skin color. Rather, the blind respondents displayed a sophisticated
appreciation for the constellation of cues—some non-visual—that
nonetheless give race its visual salience. For example, blind respondent Lia
said that it is:
[N]ot only skin color because it’s also [other] characteristics. . . . I know
that various races like the Negroid race have the characteristic of
[different] bone structure [and] facial structure. Asians [also] have
[different] facial structure [and] body structure. I know that each race
has its own set of characteristics to go with it. Color can be a defining
characteristic. But [race] is not only based on color.

The visual significance of race becomes a primary filter through which to
understand other aspects tied to race. That is, the visual aspects of race take
cognitive precedence over others, even for those who cannot see. An
example of this can be seen with how blind respondents understand the
relationship between the visual cues tied to race and what they deemed to be
secondary racial characteristics. Sighted individuals often intuit that if blind
people understand race, they can only appreciate it to the extent that it can
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be experienced through non-visual senses, such as racialized differences in
speech patterns or accents. Sighted respondent Tamia highlights this
common assumption when she said that race might be perceptible to blind
people because “even though they can’t see, they can tell by a person’s voice.
When your eyes are [not working], your other senses become stronger. So,
just because they can’t see, they can still tell by the voice whether they’re a
black person or white person or Japanese or Chinese.” But what is
interesting is that the data suggest voice and accent do not become the
primary mechanism for understanding racial difference. Rather, it remains
a secondary measure whose ultimate meaning is only relevant to blind
respondents’ visual understanding of race, which remains primary. For
example, blind respondent Sandy said that vocal and linguistic differences
do not “mean anything to me, except that I know that [the person has] a
different skin color. Jenny felt the same way, noting that hearing a person’s
voice is only useful to her in as far as it helps her answer the question:
“What would I see if I looked at you?” This phenomenon of understanding
the significance of secondary, non-visual racialized traits through the
primacy of race’s visual salience repeats itself in other areas.
The extent to which voice, surnames, and other seemingly racialized
cues are secondary to blind people’s understanding of race draws further
attention to the centrality of visual difference to their conceptions. A skeptic
may concede that the data presented thus far might support the conclusion
that blind people have a visual understanding of race but that it is
necessarily superficial; a cognitive awareness of the visual salience of race
does not necessarily mean that visual understandings of race have a
substantive impact on blind people’s day to day lives as it does for the
sighted. From this skeptical perspective, blind people are merely repeating
the visual character of race that they hear about from their sighted
colleagues without this visual aspect of race having any “real” meaning for
their lives. But such a conclusion underestimates the deep cognitive
penetrance that visual understandings of race have for blind people. Dating
is one area that exemplifies how decisions and relationships are influenced
by visual understandings of race that are as salient to blind people as they
are to those who are sighted. For example, blind respondent Davey
described a blind White friend’s dating experience in college:
He was going to college and he had started working with a reader. She
was very attractive to him, and he started seeing her. Then, somebody
told him that she was Black, and he broke it off. He broke off the
relationship. He justified it by saying that it would not have worked, in
the South, for a White man to be involved with a Black woman. But
that’s an incident that shows [how] once he learned that she was Black,
the prejudice set in.
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Kenny, a younger blind black male, offered an illuminating description
about how such racial preferences in dating may be more prevalent than
one might initially think:
A lot of my black blind friends have sort of a joke because when someone
doesn’t know our race—especially the males—they’ll find someway to
reach out and touch our hair. People want to know, and that’s the one
[racial clue] they can always get . . . It’s a way for them to figure out [your
race] if they don’t know . . . . I think [this happens] mostly in dating.
You know, if they’re going to make some decisions. I’ve seen people that
seem sort of interested in someone and then discover that they’re Black
and change their intentions. I go to a lot of the conventions now, the
national conventions [for the blind]. And there are people trying to
meet somebody [to date]. You can see that they’re kind of pursuing
somebody [that they find attractive]. And they’ll go for the hair and
then they’ll change their mind. They’re always still friendly. I’ve never
known anybody who just stopped talking to anybody altogether. They’ll
give themselves some time. But you’re Black.

This example highlights how a non-visual trait that is directly perceptible
to a blind person through other means—here, hair texture—is sought out as
a proxy for the visual cues associated with race as a way to determine the
terms, limits, and boundaries of social interactions.
The data presented thus far regarding blind people’s visual
understanding of race begins to articulate this Article’s key finding. If blind
people understand race visually and orient their lives (such as dating)
primarily around visual understandings of race just as much as sighted
people do, then it is difficult to maintain, as equal protection jurisprudence
strongly implies, that the salience of group characteristics stems from its
visual obviousness. Rather, it is becoming clear that this visual salience is
produced by something else, which might be the more socially and legally
relevant factor. But if the salience is not merely self-evident, where does it
come from?

2. Social Practices Produce Visual Understandings of Race
The qualitative data show that rather than being obvious or self-evident,
race becomes visually salient to blind (and sighted) individuals through
social practices that train people to perceive human differences in particular
ways. For sighted people this socialization process is entwined with their
visual engagement with the world, making it difficult to disentangle what is
obvious and what is produced. Blind people, on the other hand, are subject
to the same social practices without the confounding visual stimuli and can
thus detail the ways in which their visual understanding of race develops.
Several blind respondents offered detailed explanations of how they
were subjected to social practices that created their visual understanding of
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racial differences. For example, Mason described how he began to become
attuned to the visual significance accorded to race:
I began to be educated by people around me. For example, I might be
talking to someone, and I would not necessarily know [their race]
because I’m not looking at them. As far as I was concerned this was just a
person, and someone would then come to me, and let me know that this
person had been of a certain race, or color, or obvious ethnic origin
which I would not have known. Sometimes [they would] impart
information about their assumptions about that person, and how I
should or should not behave, or who I should or should not be talking
to.

Mason’s insights describe the racial rules of engagement that many
people, blind and sighted, are subjected to in terms of how to interact with
people from various racial groups. But what is important to understand is
that visual understandings of race are created by social exchanges that are
not necessarily dramatic. Rather, it is the routine description of everyday life
through a racial lens that prioritizes the significance of human physical
variation as an explanation for social order. Blind respondent Gerald
describes this dynamic:
I was brought up to learn that I was White of course. And unfortunately I
learned that I was White so that White could be contrasted with Black.
One of the first memories I have of learning about race was driving with
my father downtown. And he said “do you smell that smell?” and indeed
there was a smell. And I said yes. And he said, “That’s the smell of
nigger town.” And I didn’t know what that meant. But he was perfectly
glad to tell me. That is where the Negro lived. And then he began to
describe all the stereotypes with being a nigger or Negro. At that time,
there was supposed to be this difference. If you were pretty good, you
were a Negro. Otherwise you were a nigger. But it didn’t matter. You
still weren’t a White person and that’s the way it was. He would say
things like “you know what you smell is partly the way that they keep their
houses and their yards and there’s just trash laying all around. But
then part of what you smell is just them. They can’t help it.” And then
he would go on: “well, they talk differently because they’re less educated
and they’re less educated because they’re less capable of being
educated.” So pretty soon you begin to develop a race identity that kind
of says wow, this is sad for them and sad for us too.

This passage highlights a common theme throughout the qualitative
data collected from blind respondents: social interactions structure a
particular understanding about the visual obviousness of race that is just as
significant as that experienced by sighted individuals but is less accessible to
them given their fixation on visual fields and their ability to portray some
self-evident truth. Sighted individuals are unable to “see” how social
practices lead them to perceive human difference in particular ways. Social
practices shape the visual understandings of blind and sighted alike, training
them to seek out and give meaning to visual distinctions that align with
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social understandings of racial difference. Blind people are just more
capable of articulating the contours of these practices since they cannot be
seduced by the appeal of vision as objective truth. Jenny describes how these
social practices that produce visual understanding of race can filter blind
people’s other senses so as to give effect to an ostensible ability to “smell”
racial differences:
We had a babysitter named [Ellen], who is Black, and my stereotype of
Black people, when I was growing up was that they sweated a lot. Now, I
don’t know why I learned that, but supposedly that was the truth. And
they were overweight, generally. We had this babysitter, and I came
down one morning and said [to my Mother], “What are you doing?” She
said, “I’m washing the counters” and I asked, “Why are you washing the
counters?” She said, “Well, because Black people smell, and your
babysitter was here last night.” And I said, “That’s interesting” and filed
that away. So, [Ellen] came the next week, and she was standing with her
arm on the counter, and I walked up to the counter, and I sniffed it, and
[Ellen] said, “What are you doing?” and I said, “Oh, I’m sniffing the
counter, because my mom said you guys smell, and she’s right. There’s a
smell that’s different from ours on the counter.”

Jenny is far from the only respondent in this sample to have professed an
119
ability to smell differences between racial groups.
But this passage
highlights a common interaction that all people endure yet can be uniquely
articulated by blind people, in terms of how human difference does not
make a difference until that perceived line of difference is highlighted as a
distinctly racial difference.
It is important to reiterate that the social practices that produced the
visual understanding of race among blind respondents did not only shape
their racial perceptions in a cognitive manner, but also influenced how the

119

For example, Christopher recalled this story:
People from different races to me tend to smell different. Now, usually the way I
can identify someone of a different race is that they smell different than a
Caucasian person. Hispanic people smell different than Black people. And Asians
have their own odor. But I’m not as familiar with it because I haven’t really been
exposed to that many Asians. But I’m sure if I had been that I’d be able to
distinguish between the various Asians. But what most comes to mind is Hispanic
people smell very different than Caucasian people and Black people. But
Hispanics to me and even amongst the different Hispanics, like the Central
American group tends to smell different from Mexicans. But it’s a distinct odor.
And I don’t think it’s related to diet either because . . . second and third
generation Hispanics smell more similar to the first generation ones than White
people would. And they’re following an American diet. There’s one particular
case that I distinctly remember when I was in high school. We had this one girl
who was blonde and blue-eyed. And she spoke perfect English. And everybody
thought that she was Caucasian. And I would say no, she is Mexican obviously.
And then it came up in conversation that her father was born in Mexico. And
even though she was blonde and blue-eyed, she was half Hispanic. To me she
smelled Hispanic. So I knew she was Hispanic even though everybody else
thought she was completely Caucasian.
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respondents lived their day-to-day lives. As previously mentioned, dating is a
prime area to see how visual understandings of racial difference often affects
blind people’s ability to date across the color line. For example, Tim, a
blind Black male, discussed his difficulties with interracial dating:
I just love African-American women. I don’t know why. I had White
friends that I hung out with, and we went to class together, and worked
on projects together. I just never had a desire to do that. . . . I tried it,
but I just couldn’t gravitate to it. I think I did it for about a week, and I
was just like, “No, I can’t do this.”

In the context of dating, race is often actively sought out by blind people
to determine the nature and feasibility of any ongoing relationship—in part
because social practices produce an awareness of the ways in which
interracial relationships visually disrupt social norms pertaining to
appropriate romantic and sexual partnering. For example, Madge, a blind
White female respondent, said:
Race is important in terms of a date. I remember meeting this guy at a
program for the blind at the university. And most of the guys there I
wasn’t really that impressed with. But this one guy, he really stood out.
And I liked him and I enjoyed talking to him and stuff. And when I
found out that he was Black, I knew it wasn’t going to work for me. But I
felt kind of bad then, because I was hoping that it would [work out]. But
that’s where [race] usually makes the most difference in my life.

But race plays this important role of structuring the terms of human
interactions beyond the realm of dating. For example, blind respondent
Tammy said that she finds information about a person’s race valuable since:
[I]t makes it easier to interact with them [so] I won’t say a stupid
thing . . . something like a statement that would be assuming that they’re
White. [It’s also important] just so that I can have equal access to
information. I can say it matches the information that the sighted person
has. It’s really important to me.

Taken as a whole, the findings from this empirical research show that
race is understood and experienced visually for both blind and sighted
people. This points to a shared social experience that makes race visually
identifiable rather than it simply being known by visual observation—
empirical evidence that belies both the social and legal emphasis on visibility
as the touchstone for race becoming salient. In addition to showing that
blind people understand race visually, the qualitative data exposes how the
strong visual sensibility attached to race is produced by constitutive social
practices that shape the social interactions of blind and sighted in almost
indistinguishable ways.
Although the “race” ipsa loquitur trope embedded in various aspects of
law and society relies heavily on the idea that race visually speaks for itself,
the data provide evidence that race is not merely a visually obvious
phenomenon; its visual significance is produced, not simply observed. Since
these constitutive social practices come to light through examining blind

Jan. 2013]

CAN THE BLIND LEAD THE BLIND?

755

people’s experiences yet structure both blind and sighted people’s racial
consciousness, this data suggests that it may be time to rethink the
assumption embedded throughout equal protection jurisprudence that the
salience of race stems from its visual obviousness. In short, the empirical
evidence suggests that “seeing race” has less to do with anything visually
obvious about human bodies and more about the social practices that train
us to look a certain way at them. This suggests that the “race” ipsa loquitur
trope that orients the scrutiny inquiry, colorblindness, and the intent
doctrine may not only be misinformed, but may also fundamentally warp the
Court’s understanding of how race becomes salient in a manner that can
lead to remarkable injustices. This will be further explored in the next
section.

IV. WHY EMPIRICALLY DESTABILIZING THE “RACE” IPSA LOQUITUR
TROPE MATTERS: REORIENTING EQUAL PROTECTION AROUND SOCIAL
PRACTICES
This Article’s contribution is its empirical demonstration that visual
understandings of race are created largely by social practices rather than
mere observation—a contribution that is related to yet extends social
constructionists’ demonstration of how meanings attach to bodies. These
findings suggest that visual understandings of race flourish regardless of
vision; social practices produce a visual understanding of race that compels
even blind people to “see” race and live their lives around the existence and
social significance of racial boundaries. Sighted people’s vision prevents
them from grasping the role of social practices in producing the salience of
race. Blind people’s inability to be misled by the seemingly self-evident
nature of race brings the production of race’s visual salience into focus,
which allows us to understand the significance of social practices to the
perceptibility of group differences in race and beyond. Gerald, a blind
respondent, nicely summarizes this concept:
Race is very often not a mystery to blind people. Which is in a sense kind
of sad. I think that sometimes [sighted] people look at blind folks and
they think [that] these people can show us the way to a kind of Star Trek
race blind society. And it would be great if we could do that. But we’re
just as much a victim of racial prejudice, stereotypes, and misconceptions
as anybody else. And the fact that we’re not clued to it directly by vision
doesn’t, in my mind, change that a bit. I think that I suffer all of the
unfortunate characteristics of my upbringing regarding race that my
[sighted] brothers and sisters do.

Ginny echoes this sentiment: “I really don’t think it’s a matter of vision
truthfully. . . . I was so amazed when this professor of mine had the premise
[that blind people do not understand race.] . . . He said ‘well then you’re
not prejudiced at all, are you?’ I thought [it’s] so odd that he thinks that
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[it] is all about vision.” Mason also corroborated this thought, noting that
race is “very much a learned thinking and behavior that doesn’t have much
to do with what you can see or not.”
This empirical study of blind people’s understandings and experiences
with race is relevant to equal protection to the extent that it calls into
question the “race” ipsa loquitur sensibility embedded in this jurisprudence
and suggests that it may distort important aspects of this area of law. This
section reviews some of the existing critiques of the scrutiny inquiry,
colorblindness, and the intent doctrine to situate the contribution made by
this Article’s normative claim: that “race” ipsa loquitur must be thoroughly
eviscerated from equal protection in order to pursue a new orienting theory
of race that is sensitive to the ways in which social practices produce its
salience. This section will discuss how reorienting equal protection along
these lines will lead to a more just and equitable jurisprudence.

A. The Scrutiny Inquiry
Kenji Yoshino offers the most critical assessment of how the visibility of
groups’ traits shapes the Court’s determination of whether a plaintiff is a
member of a suspect class for equal protection purposes. Yoshino is
primarily concerned with what he calls equal protection’s assimilationist bias
in which there is a presumption that groups distinguished by visible traits are
particularly deserving of heightened scrutiny; subjugating groups without
visually distinguishing traits to rational basis review effectively encourages
120
them to assimilate to avoid discrimination.
Yoshino sees this as an
illegitimate response to discrimination deserving of greater constitutional
protection—such as measures that discriminate against gays and lesbians—
and therefore argues that the immutability/visibility prong should be
eliminated since it “[is a] bad prox[y] for either substantive inequality or
121
processual powerlessness.”
But in critiquing the limits of the visibility prong to adequately capture
which groups should be in or out, Yoshino’s perspective still lends itself to
120
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This is different from the “race” ipsa loquitur critique offered by this Article in that my
focus is on how a particular theory of race shapes the Court’s equal protection inquiry.
Yoshino’s visibility presumption is part of a discussion of the normative implications of
how law thinks groups other than women and racial minorities should respond to
discrimination, i.e. hiding or covering. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769
(2002) [hereinafter Yoshino, Covering].
Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection, supra note 23, at 570. Yoshino argues that
equal protection’s heightened scrutiny inquiry should be reconstituted on a process basis.
He “propose[s] that the limiting principle should be a refined analysis of political
powerlessness. . . . [A] multifactor determination of political powerlessness should
perform the gatekeeping function performed by the immutability and visibility factors.”
Id. at 565.
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reifying the dividing line between “visible” and “invisible”—at least to the
extent that this boundary is not the subject of critique and remains coherent
122
Yoshino aptly notes the socially constructed notion of
in his formulation.
race—in terms of the way social meanings attach to bodies—and questions
the stability of the Court’s distinction between corporeal and social traits in
privileging the former for heightened scrutiny. He argues that “there is no
such thing as a purely biologically visible trait, for visibility is always
123
relational, requiring a performer and an observer.”
This
acknowledgement of visibility’s social context is more sophisticated than
other equal protection discussions on the visibility of group traits. But,
Yoshino’s emphasis on relationality and social context can and should be
pushed further, especially given the empirical data discussed in Part III.
Visibility, and specifically the salience of particular group traits, is not simply
relationally known, ping ponging between the dichotomous categories of
“visible” and “invisible” depending on context and audience. This account
does not sufficiently critique the coherency of “visibility” and “invisibility” as
categories that capture race as not only something that is merely visible but
salient. Here lies the danger of reification; “visibility” and “invisibility,”
though conceptualized as relational, can nonetheless sediment as an
objectively known reality. To the contrary, it is important to emphasize that
there is a productive genealogy behind the salience of certain group traits
that embed themselves in social structure that constitutes our ability to
think, see, and be struck by what we see in certain ways. Thus, the
constitutive understanding of vision offered by this Article provides a richer
account that goes beyond a discussion of the contexts that allow individuals
to see in particular settings or relations and draws attention to the structural
capacities that orient the way entire societies visually engage with the world. It
is the broader, structural understanding of race and vision that this Article
identifies as a constitutive theory of race that complements yet extends
existing social constructionist discourses.
This matters because the lack of sociological nuance in the current
three-prong approach inhibits a robust, and arguably more faithful,
application of equal protection principles. By demonstrating the social
practices that produce the visual salience of race, the empirical data allow us
to transcend the fragmented constitutional remedies that orient around the

122
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Yoshino notes that “the distinction between social and corporeal visibility is retained not
because it is accurate, but because it accurately describes the intuition of the courts.” Id.
at 498. This explicitly questions the dividing line between what he terms “social” (e.g.,
religion) and “corporeal” (e.g., skin color) visibility found in the Court’s jurisprudence,
but does not similarly critique the dichotomous categories “visible” and “invisible”—or, to
put it differently, how certain bodies become visible—which retain some level of coherency.
Id. at 498.
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visibility of group traits to have a greater appreciation of how discriminatory
social practices produce visible lines of group difference. Thus, changing
the directionality of this relationship—from visible traits → race salience to a
different model where race salience (socially produced) → visibility of
traits—allows for a more flexible understanding of how shifting social
attitudes can produce, highlight, or minimize the visibility of certain groups
depending on social contexts.
Therefore, the take-home doctrinal point from putting these empirical
findings in conversation with equal protection’s scrutiny inquiry is that
treating race as self-evidently known and salient traits that justify the Court’s
special solicitude trivializes equal protection by framing constitutionally
impermissible discrimination as something that starts from the visual
perception of obvious human difference. Instead, the empirical findings
discussed in Part III suggest that courts should examine the social practices
that make certain human traits salient in the first place. Re-orienting the
scrutiny inquiry to focus on these social practices as a constitutional problem
of first concern opens up a jurisprudential discussion of how the
discriminatory treatment of certain groups currently not considered to be a
suspect class—such as homosexuals and poor people—may nevertheless
merit more than mere rational basis review due to the history of
discrimination and current practices that produce their social salience (at
times visible, and at times not) as targets for state-sponsored classifications
124
that work against their group interest.
Such an approach would alter the
equal protection inquiry to be sensitive to the social practices of
homophobia and classism that repeatedly make homosexuals and poor
people the subject of discriminatory state actions, leading to a more
sociologically robust jurisprudence. This might engender a more coherent
and consistent equal protection jurisprudence that places justice rather than
deceptively self-evident categories of “visible” and “invisible” at the heart of
the inquiry.

B. Colorblindness
Part II.B.2. discusses the current literature critical of colorblindness,
where several scholars have identified the social and political circumstances
giving rise to a new form of politics and constitutionalism that discourages
race consciousness in equal protection jurisprudence, even when done to

124

For a discussion on homosexuals and poor people as putative suspect classes for equal
protection purposes, see Renee Culverhouse & Christine Lewis, Homosexuality as a Suspect
Class, 34 S. TEX. L. REV. 205 (1993); Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever:
Deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law, Dual Rules of Law, & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 629 (2008).
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remedy ongoing inequality linked to past harms. In this Article, I have taken
colorblindness as a metaphor seriously in drawing attention to how its
coherence turns upon a theory of race that frames its salience as a function
of visual cues to imply that blindness or non-recognition can lead to a racial
utopia. The significance of this metaphorical coherence is not merely
literary or rhetorical; empirical studies demonstrate how metaphors play
upon our brains’ cognitive structure to fundamentally shape how we
understand the world and our sense of justice. Therefore, the data
discussed in Part III disrupt the seemingly intuitive nature of the colorblind
metaphor by demonstrating that its central organizing principle—that the
salience of race is primarily a visual phenomenon and that non-recognition
in and of itself facilitates equality—is empirically inaccurate. As the many
blind respondents report, race is experienced and understood as a visually
salient characteristic in a manner that is no less complicated or fraught than
it is for their sighted counterparts.
Disrupting the colorblind metaphor’s coherence through empirical
methods is important. By offering qualitative data showing that the
operating assumption behind the metaphor is simply inaccurate, the
metaphor is rendered incoherent in a manner that raises piercing questions
for the ideology and jurisprudence it supports. This is not to say that the
metaphor, in and of itself, is a primary driver of the ideology and
jurisprudence. Rather, it is to acknowledge that the metaphor leverages our
cognitive abilities to shape our worldviews in a manner that gives undue
legitimacy to an approach that can and should be disrupted by the available
empirical evidence. By focusing on the social practices that produce
individuals’ ability to see the world in particular ways, this disruption draws
attention to the need for alternative conceptions of society and human
relationships that reflect reality. Reorienting the normative commitments to
equal protection around constitutive social practices rather than “race” ipsa
loquitur suggests that colorblindness and its concomitant jurisprudence of
non-recognition given coherence through the metaphor should be retired.
Taking social practices seriously as the stimulant of race becoming visually
salient suggests a new understanding of race that might inform this jurisprudence in a manner that fully engages context and racial hierarchy in fulfilling equal protection’s mandate.

C. Intent Doctrine
Legal scholars have used theories of unconscious bias to critique the
125
Implicit bias
discriminatory intent requirement since the late 1980s.
125

See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (examining the discriminatory intent doctrine
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research has resurrected the critique that requiring a legal finding of intent
126
By providing quantitative
misses how racism operates in real life.
measures of bias through experimental measures such as the Implicit
Association Test (“IAT”), this area of research has given greater empirical
credence to notions that individuals often harbor unintentional sentiments
that affect their human interactions—a perspective that raises severe if not
fatal challenges for legal standards requiring direct proof of malice.
The prospects of using these findings to inform law has stirred a zealous
debate over whether courts and legislatures should give credence to studies
based upon unconscious or implicit bias. Not everyone agreess that implicit
bias research is ripe enough to justify broad sweeping changes. For
127
example, Gregory Mitchell and Philip Tetlock argue that implicit bias
measures suffer from serious methodological shortcomings pertaining to
128
129
130
measurement, association, and predictability in real world settings.

126

127
128

through the lens of unconsicous motivation analysis). Barbara Flagg develops a corollary
theory of White transparency:
The imposition of transparently white norms is a unique form of unconscious
discrimination, one that cannot be assimilated to the notion of irrationalism that is
central to the liberal ideology of racism. While racial stereotyping can be
condemned as the failure accurately to perceive the individual for who he really is,
and bias as the inability to exclude subjective misconceptions or hostilities, or
both, from one’s decisionmaking processes, transparency exemplifies the
structural aspect of white supremacy. Beyond the individual forms of racism that
stereotyping, bias, and hostility represent lie the vast terrains of institutional
racism—the maintenance of institutions that systematically advantage whites—and
cultural racism—the usually unstated assumption that white culture is superior to
all others. Because the liberal gravitates toward abstract individualism and its
predicates, she generally fails to recognize or to address the more pervasive harms
that institutional and cultural white supremacy inflict. The exercise of focusing
exclusively on the transparency phenomenon as an exemplar of structural racism,
then, has transformative potential for the white liberal, both on the personal level
and as a springboard for reflection on what it means for government genuinely to
provide the equal protection of the laws.
Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of
Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 959 (1993)
Jerry Kang and Mahzarin Banaji note:
The science of [implicit social cognition] examines those mental processes that
operate without conscious awareness or conscious control but nevertheless
influence fundamental evaluations of individuals and groups. . . . [E]vidence from
hundreds of thousands of individuals [who have taken the IAT] across the globe
shows that (1) the magnitude of implicit bias toward members of outgroups or
disadvantaged groups is large, (2) implicit bias often conflicts with conscious
attitudes, endorsed beliefs, and intentional behavior, (3) implicit bias influences
evaluations of and behavior toward those who are the subject of the bias, and (4)
self, situational, or broader cultural interventions can correct systematic and
consensually shared implicit bias.
Jerry Kang & Mahzarin Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative
Action”, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2006).
See Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of
Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023 (2006).
Mitchell and Tetlock point to psychologists’ sharp disagreement over what the IAT
measures. Id. at 1086. For example, mere familiarity with social norms linking race and
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These concerns are not entirely without merit. But, for the purposes of this
Article, the IAT and other critiques of discriminatory intent based upon
unconscious bias may also be limited to the extent that they largely speak to
the social construction of race—how meanings come to attach to particular
bodies—and not how race comes to be experienced and understood as a
salient part of the social and legal world. While it is crucially important to
flesh out the cognitive biases that lead meanings to unconsciously attach to
certain bodies in a manner that reflects social constructionism, it is equally
important to understand the constitutive nature of how social practices
produce the very visibility and coherence surrounding individuals’
experiences with racial difference.
Much of the intent inquiry—
131
theoretically, historically, and doctrinally entangled with colorblindness —

129

130

131

pejorative group meanings (e.g., being aware of them without endorsing them) can lead
to IAT scores indistinguishable from those harboring bona fide animus (e.g., those who
are both aware and endorse applying pejorative meanings to certain groups). See Sachiko
Kinoshita & Marie Peek-O’Leary, Does the compatibility effect in the race Implicit Association
Test reflect familiarity or affect?, 12 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 442, 450–51 (2005). Other
demonstrated explanations for poor IAT scores are feelings of empathy for minority
groups and test anxiety linked to the fear of being called a bigot. See Eric Luis Uhlmann
et al., Are members of low status groups perceived as bad, or badly off? Egalitarian negative
associations and automatic prejudice, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 491 (2006) (arguing
that many negative reactions to other races may be rooted in egalitarian feelings);
Cynthia M. Frantz et al., A Threat in the Computer: The Race Implicit Association Test as a
Stereotype Threat Experience, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1611 (2004)
(discussing how a test-taker’s fear of confirming racial stereotypes may affect how the testtaker answers IAT questions). Mitchell and Tetlock argue that implicit bias methodology
has not been able to hash out unconscious bias from other variables that can produce
depressed IAT scores. Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 128, at 1086. As a matter of
science, this makes it difficult to definitively state that implicit bias is as widespread as IAT
proponents make it out to be.
The IAT relies upon individuals’ reaction times in tasks where they associate positive or
negative words with group attributes. Quicker reactions are understood as having a
stronger association between, for example, “Blacks” and “lazy” or “Asian” and “smart.”
However, Mitchell and Tetlock argue “psychometric studies have shown that a host of
factors other than association strength can affect reaction time (e.g. cognitive flexibility,
asymmetries in stimuli familiarity, and evaluation apprehension).” Mitchell & Tetlock,
supra note 128, at 1033. By assuming that different reaction times only reflect attitudes
and biases, Mitchell and Tetlock suggest that IAT proponents have not adequately
designed their studies to take into account the effects of other variables.
Mitchell and Tetlock argue that even if these measurement and association issues were
resolved, proponents of using implicit bias research to redesign law have yet to
demonstrate that “discriminatory conduct found in artificial laboratory settings reliably
predict behavior in real-world settings that often have institutionalized layers of
safeguards against the expression of prejudice.” Id. at 1033. The authors argue that in
virtually every aspect of scientific research, laboratory findings do not necessarily express
themselves in the real world. Thus, to suggest legal change before any connection is
made between laboratory IAT scores and discriminatory behavior in daily life is arguably
premature.
See generally López, Intentional Blindness, supra note 65.
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orients around a particular reductionist understanding that disaggregates
race from social context and hierarchy to recast it as a discrete trait that is
purposefully targeted and presumptively self-evidently known. The intent
doctrine replicates a discreteness regarding race and how it is apprehended
as well as comprehended that is sociologically inaccurate; social practices,
not merely discrete, acontextual racial markers of human difference, give
rise to the visual salience of race that often leads to discriminatory actions
and experiences. To the extent that the findings from the empirical
components of this Article draw attention to the role of social practices in
producing the visual salience of race, I argue that the intent doctrine also
needs to be substantially revisited in favor of an approach that takes social
practices, context, and racial hierarchy seriously.

V. CONCLUSION
Taken together, I conclude by arguing that the “race” ipsa loquitur thread
of reasoning embedded in equal protection’s scrutiny inquiry,
colorblindness, and intent doctrine must be thoroughly eviscerated. The
“race” ipsa loquitur sensibility reproduces a troubling typological conception
of race and discrimination that overemphasizes what people look like to the
detriment of having a more sophisticated understanding of the social
practices that make certain groups visible targets of discrimination to begin
with. By emphasizing the productive genealogy of groups’ visual salience, I
suggest a stronger engagement with the discriminatory social practices that
produce the coherency of certain groups’ visibility—whether it be by race,
class, religion, or any other characteristic central to individual and/or group
identity. The point here is not that vision does not matter. Rather, the
constitutionally relevant issue should be the social practices that make race a
salient line of human difference.
Equal protection’s emphasis on visibility distorts discussions on the
nature of race and, more importantly, may obscure judicial deliberations of
the most effective way to use racial categorizations thoughtfully. Focusing
on visibility privileges a certain way of thinking about race that historically
has been intertwined with racial subordination, i.e., that race differences are
real, tangible, and obvious rather than a product of social practices. This
not only hurts other groups facing discrimination, but creates an
impoverished understanding of racial discrimination that ultimately
disserves racial minorities and inhibits any true effort at creating a fair
society. Law must address the ways in which society trains us to think racially
along typological lines of human difference that ultimately foster the very
type of subordination that we must commit ourselves to eradicating.
The point of the qualitative analysis and doctrinal critique presented in
this Article is not to simply make sure law conforms to the empirical realities
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of social life on the ground, but to encourage more sophisticated and
responsible conceptions of race by legal actors and legal scholars. It is time
to begin a series of conversations about the future relationship between race
and law, focusing in particular on what can be done to escape the
reductionist theoretical quagmire that has defined race in American
jurisprudence for the past four hundred years. Thinking empirically about
equal protection is an important first step.
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